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HANNAH GOSNELL*

Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act and the Art of Compromise: The
Evolution of a Reasonable and Prudent
Alternative for the Animas-La Plata
Project"
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for
implementing one of the most powerful and controversialenvironmental statutes in the United States today: Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, which prohibitsfederal actions likely to
further jeopardize a species listed under the Act. Because of a
variety of political and institutional constraints, however, the
agency has had a difficult time implementing the statuteforcefully.
After reviewing the Section 7 consultationprocessand the evolution
of the "reasonableand prudent alternative" (RPA) concept, the
articletakes an in-depth look at the Section 7 consultationprocess
for the proposed Animas-La Plata Project on the San Juan River
and at some of the problems surrounding the resulting RPA.
Several institutionalconstraints confronting the FWS are identified, and suggestions are made for strengthening the agency's
position during the Section 7 implementation process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)' is one of the most powerful and
controversial environmental laws in the United States. Implementing the
Act has resulted in many conflicts with property rights and development
interests and, in a growing number of cases, with tribal sovereignty and/or
tribal projects. Thus, there is a need to find ways to integrate the goals of the
ESA into society while minimizing conflict, especially with those already at
a disadvantage (e.g., Indian tribes). At the same time, the mandate for
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" This article is derived from Dr. Gosnell's dissertation, titled Water, Fish, Tribes, and
Choice: A Geographic Evaluation of Endangered Species Act Implementation in the San Juan River
Basin, USA. The author would like to thank David Getches for his help and advice in writing
the article and Jim Robb for his help with producing the map included in the article.
1. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
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recovery contained in the Act must not be routinely subordinated to human
needs and demands.
This balancing act is to a large extent in the hands of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), which has been delegated the responsibility of
implementing the Act.2 This is a significant responsibility because, as
historian Samuel Hays has suggested, it is in the administration and
implementation of policy and law-more so than in the legislative
beginnings-that future interpretations of the law are determined,
for choices are made here that are as fundamental as those
made in the legislature. As soon as a law is passed the
political actors shift their focus of attention from Congress to
the agency. In this new arena they seek to fight through the
controversies all over again. Those who sought to achieve a
social objective through the law hope that administration will
maintain and advance that goal. But their opponents hope
that through administration the impact of the law can be
reduced. In this way administration becomes the focal point
of fierce controversy. To those in contention, decisions here
are considered to be more vital because they are more final.3
One of the most important decision-making processes employed by
the FWS in the implementation of the ESA occurs during the formulation
of Biological Opinions under Section 7 of the Act.4 The FWS has broad
discretionary authority here, including the authority (indeed, obligation) to
issue an Opinion prohibiting any proposed5 federal action likely to further
jeopardize an already endangered species.
While Biological Opinions are supposed to be immune from
considerations other than the welfare of the species in question,6 they are,
in fact, heavily influenced by politics and other constraints! As it turns out,
the FWS rarely, if ever, uses Section 7 of the ESA to prohibit a federal
project outright. More often than not, the agency identifies a "reasonable

2. See id. § 1532(15). In the case of endangered or threatened marine species, the
consultation responsibility falls on the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
3.

SAMUEL HAYs, BEAUrY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENcE 6 (1987).

4. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(c). This balancing act is also evident in the formulation of Habitat
Conservation Plans (HCPs) under Section 10 of the ESA, which deals with the granting of
"incidental take permits" for private property owners burdened by the "No Take" provision
in Section 9 of the Act.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
6. Id.
7. See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 278, 280-81 (1993); U.S. GEN.
AccouwwNc OmFfcE, LIMITED EFFEcT OF CONSERVATION REQUIREMENTS ON WESTERN WATER
PROJECTS, PuB. No. GAO/RCED-87-78, at 2-3 (1987).
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and prudent alternative" (RPA) in its Biological Opinion, allowing the
project to go forward in modified form.8
But what happens when a project is so clearly detrimental to a
listed species that the FWS cannot find an alternative? This article looks at
the Section 7 process for the Animas-La Plata Project, one of the few cases
in ESA implementation history involving a "naked" Jeopardy Opinion (a
Biological Opinion citing jeopardy with no alternatives),9 and documents
its evolution into an Opinion with an RPA. The Animas-La Plata (A-LP)
case study illustrates the difficulties confronted by the FWS in implementing Section 7(a)(2) forcefully, in the face of powerful political and institutional constraints. The Animas-La Plata example also demonstrates that
were the FWS truly able to consider a wide range of alternatives to a
detrimental project, endangered species might receive the level of protection originally intended by Congress.
Therefore, I argue that the FWS regulatory ability to consider a
wider range of alternatives during the Section 7 consultation process,
including the alternative of a naked Jeopardy Opinion, should be strengthened. I also argue for the importance of better understanding the nature of
the constraints on the decisions made by the FWS during implementation
of Section 7. Only by gaining insight into these constraints, many of them
potentially unnecessary, will we have the opportunity to improve the
decision-making process. The purpose of this article, then, is to use lessons
learned from the Animas-La Plata case study to identify ways to improve
decision making in the formulation of Biological Opinions, with the
underlying goal of strengthening the position of endangered species during
the balancing process.'°
This article first reviews the requirements of Section 7 and looks at
how its implementation has evolved and what legal analysts have said
about the use of discretion by the FWS in the implementation of Section 7.
Next the article presents the Animas-La Plata case study, focusing on the
evolution of the FWS Biological Opinion from a naked Jeopardy Opinion in
1990 to an Opinion with an RPA in 1991. While the RPA for A-LP appears
to technically comply with the law, I argue that there may have been better

8. Houck, supra note 7, at 317-22; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2000).
9. The 1990 Draft Biological Opinion for the Animas-La Plata Project was the only naked
Jeopardy Opinion-draft or final-ever issued by Region 6 of the FWS. Interview with Keith
Rose, Biologist, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Region 6, in Grand Junction, Colo. (Jan. 12,

2000).
10. While the decisions discussed in this article are nearly ten years old, I argue that they
are an important part of ESA implementation history, since the FWS rarely, if ever, issues
naked Jeopardy Opinions. The story of how and why the FWS changed its Opinion to allow
A-LP to go forward provides a unique insight into the nature and magnitude of the constraints
under which the agency must operate.
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alternatives that were either not considered or were discounted because of
the mechanics of the consultation process and a lack of institutional strength
on the part of the FWS. The article concludes that, based on the A-LP
experience, strengthening the ability of the FWS to issue naked Jeopardy
Opinions where appropriate would stimulate more flexible and creative
problem solving on the part of federal action agencies. Specifically,
regulatory requirements for broader alternatives analysis, a larger
leadership role in the Section 7 process for the FWS, and greater involvement by the concerned public to balance the political scales would
strengthen the ability of the FWS to implement the ESA as Congress
originally intended.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 7 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
The driving rationale behind passage of the Endangered Species
Act in 1973, as reflected in congressional debate, was the need to conserve
our biological heritage." As legal scholar George Cameron Coggins
observes,
The dominant theme pervading all Congressional discussion
of the proposed [Endangerid Species Act of 1973] was the
overriding need to devote whatever effort and resources were
necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife resources. Much of the testimony at the hearings and much debate was devoted to the biological problem
of extinction. Senators and Congressmen uniformly deplored

11. See, e.g., Hearings on EndangeredSpecies before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries,93rd Cong. 280 (statement of Rep. Roe); i. at 281 (statement of
Rep. Whitehurst); id. at 207 (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Interior). See also H.R. REP.
No. 93412 (1973) (reporting on H.R. 37, a bill containing essentially the same features as the
ESA). See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,172-84 (1978) (comprehensively analyzing
the original congressional intent). Congressional intent clearly changed in the wake of this
seminal court case, as reflected in the amendments of 1978 and 1982 to the ESA. Section 7 was
most affected by the 1978 amendments, when Congress softened some of the language
surrounding the No Jeopardy standard, required the FWS to identify reasonable and prudent
alternatives to those actions that would otherwise jeopardize a species, and added an
exemption process to allow certain projects to go forward in spite of their jeopardy to listed
species. For discussions surrounding the 1978 amendments, see, for example, 124 CONG. REC.
19,284, 21,128, 21,131, 21,284, 21,556, 21,599 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453; S. REp. No. 95-874, at 10 (1978). For a general overview of the history
and evolution of the ESA, see MICHAEL J.BEAN & MELANIE J.ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 193-276 (3d ed. 1997); Houck, supranote 7, at 281-85.
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the irreplaceable loss to aesthetics, science, ecology, and the
national heritage should more species disappear.
The resulting statute represented the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever passed by any nation and remains
today one of the most powerful environmental laws on record, in spite of
subsequent amendments that have sought to temper the strength of the law.
After briefly reviewing the main components of the Act, this section focuses
on Section 7 of the ESA as it stands today.
In Section 2 of the Act, Congress declares that the purpose of the
ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the3
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species...."
Required conservation measures include
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but
are not limited to, all activities associated with scientific
resources management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live
trapping, and transplantation, and in the extraordinary case
where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot
be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking. 4
In other words, the central goal of the Endangered Species Act is recovery,
not merely protection of the status quo.
Section 7 is comprised of two main parts, 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2), which
deal with affirmative obligations and prohibitory commands respectively.
The main purpose of Section 7(a)(1) is to authorize federal agencies-e.g.,
the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), the Bureau of Land Management, the
National Forest Service, the National Park Service, etc.-to factor endangered species conservation into their planning process, regardless of other
statutory directives. Most of the attention surrounding Section 7 implementation has centered on the prohibitions contained in 7(a)(2).
Section 7(a)(2)-"the single most significant provision of the
Endangered Species Act"s--further elaborates on the extent to which
federal agencies are accountable:

12. George Cameron Cogguis, ConservingWildlife Resources:An Overviewof the Endangered
Species Act of 1973,51 N.D.L REV. 315,321 (1974) (emphasis added.).
13. The Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
14. Id.§ 1532(3).
15.

BEAN &ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 240.
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Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency.. .is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined
by the Secretary after consultation as appropriate with
affected States, to be critical...."
The implementing regulations define "jeopardize the continued existence
of" as "to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly
or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species." 7
The words "any action" in the passage above are quite wide
reaching and refer to all actions directly or indirectly causing modifications
of land, water, air, or other elements of a listed species' environment. An
"action" can include federal activities or programs, promulgations of
regulations, or granting of licenses, contracts, permits, leases, easements,
and rights of way, for example. Thus, even the reauthorization of a dam
that has existed for 30 years is subject to the consultation process under this
portion of the Act.
The consultation process is a critical part of ESA implementation,
since this is where prospective developers negotiate with the FWS for
permission to go ahead with projects that could affect endangered species.
This process was formalized in the 1978 amendments in the wake of
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,8 a pivotal case (discussed below). The
1978 amendments were intended to minimize conflicts between proposed
federal actions and listed species or their critical habitats.
A later amendment addressed the more specific problem of how to
deal with conflicts between Section 7 and federal actions related to water
development." The 1982 amendment was made in response to complaints
from the water development community during implementation of the ESA
in the Upper Colorado River Basin 2 and reads as follows: "It is further
declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate
with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert

16. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
17. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000)
18.

437 U.S. 153 (1978).

19. BEAN &ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 243,

20. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2).
21. Margot Zailen, Evolution of ESA Consultations on Western Water Projects, NAT.
RESOURCEs & ENV'T, Fail 1986, at 41, 41.
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with conservation of endangered species."22 This statute imposes "substantial and continuing obligations on federal agencies" to cooperate with local
water entities. ' These obligations make it difficult for the FWS to distance
itself from the water development community during consultation, a fact
that becomes even more apparent when we look at the history of ESA
implementation in the San Juan River Basin as it relates to the Animas-La
Plata Project.
The procedural requirements for complying with Section 7 are
comprised of a three step process: (1) federal agencies proposing an action
(e.g., the Bureau of Reclamation) must inquire whether any threatened or
endangered species may be present in the area of the proposed' action;24 (2)
if a protected species may exist in the area, then the agency must prepare
a biological assessment to determine whether such species is likely to be
affected by the action,' and (3) if the assessment determines that a listed
species is likely to be affected by the action, then the agency must initiate
formal consultation with the Secretary of the Interior. 26 In practice, only a
small percentage of federal actions are subjected to a formal consultation. '
Formal consultations result in a "Biological Opinion" issued by the
FWS. The Biological Opinion analyzes not only the specific federal action,
but also the overall context of what is happening to the species. In
determining whether the project is likely to jeopardize the species, the FWS
looks at three things: (1) The Environmental Baseline-an analysis of the
accumulated effect of past and ongoing human and natural impacts that
have led to the current state of the species, including ongoing and past
actions, actions that have successfully completed Section 7 consultation but
are not yet in place, and recurring natural phenomenon such as drought or
flooding that may affect the species habitat; (2) The Effect of the Action-a
multi-faceted analysis of the direct or immediate impact of the project on
the species or its habitat, the indirect impacts anticipated later from the
action, and the impacts of actions that are interrelated or interdependent to
the federal action; and (3) The Cumulative Effects--an analysis of the
reasonably certain future non-federal actions that may affect the species. "
The FWS looks at these three factors. in their totality and determines

22.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2).

23.
24.

Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1313 (8th Cir. 1989).
§ 1536(c)(1).

25.

Id.

26. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
27. See Houck, supra note 7, for a critical assessment of ESA implementation as practiced
by the FWS. According to one study Houck cites, 90 percent of all consultations under the ESA
are disposed of informally.

28. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
29. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14(h), 402.02 (2000).
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whether the accumulated effect is expected to "reduce appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the
wild."' This is known as "the jeopardy standard."
There are three possible outcomes from a formal consultation:
(1)a No Jeopardy Opinion (the project may go ahead without restrictions);
(2) a naked Jeopardy Opinion (the project will jeopardize species and there
are no alternatives, thus the project may not go ahead); or (3) a Jeopardy
Opinion with "reasonable and prudent alternatives" (the project as
presented will jeopardize the species in question, but it can be modified to
minimize impact and prevent jeopardy).1
The court has characterized the Biological Opinion as a "deliberative tool"3 that requires careful weighing and consideration. The court has
also stated that the purpose of the Biological Opinion is "to attenuate any
conflicts between the agency action and the welfare of the endangered
species. Reasonable and prudent alternatives must be proposed by the
consulting agency so that the action agency can evaluate options that might
reconcile any conflict." x' Reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) have
thus been institutionalized as a means to balance the needs of listed species
with the human need/desire to develop resources in endangered species
habitat. Thus, the RPA is an important concept to examine. Congress
articulated the RPA concept as follows: "If jeopardy or adverse modification
is found, the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent
alternatives which he believes would not violate subsection (a)(2) and can
be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency
action."' The FWS defined "reasonable and prudent alternatives" as
alternative actions identified during formal consultation that
can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended

purpose of the action, that can be implemented consistent

with the scope of the Federal agency's legal authority and
jurisdiction, that is economically and technologically feasible,
and that the Director [of the FWS] believes would avoid the
likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed
species or resulting in the destruction or adverse modification
of critical habitat.
Thus, there are four prongs to the definition of an RPA. This definition will
be looked at more closely in later sections of the article.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. § 402.02.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332,347 (D.D.C. 1980).
Id.

34.
35.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3).
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
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The wide-reaching scope and power of Section 7 was not fully
appreciated until 1978, with the landmark Supreme Court case Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill.' In fact, the case had such ramifications for
implementation protocol that some have characterized the political history
of the ESA as divided into two eras: before and after Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill.37 As former Rocky Mountain Regional Solicitor Margot
Zallen observed about the reaction to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
"people never thought it [the ESA] meant what it said, including half the
members of Congress."'
In reaction to the Supreme Court's findings in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, Congress amended the ESA in 1978 to create more
3 Among other things, the amendments
"flexibility" in implementation.further developed the notion of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" as
a means to resolving conflict in the consultation process and, hinting at
ways to mitigate the impact of the Act, even stating that "the consultation
process can resolve many if not most of the conflicts that might develop
under the Act."'
The Upper Colorado River Basin 4' (see below for map of the
Colorado River Basin) provided a good opportunity to try out this new, less
adversarial approach to Section 7 implementation. The FWS approach to the
consultation process there represents an important turning point in the
history of the Act, for it was in the Upper Colorado Basin that the agency
36. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
37. Michael J.Bean, Looking Back Over the First Fifteen Years, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK
or EXInNCTON 37,40-42 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991).

38. Margot Zallen, Rocky Mountain Regional Solicitor, Address at the University of
Colorado School of Law (Jan. 25, 2000).
39. The most significant development was the creation of a way to get around a naked
Jeopardy Opinion (where there were no identifiable RPAs to mitigate the impact), called the
exemption process. Congress authorized the concept of an Endangered Species Committee
comprised of seven agency heads and appointees. This committee, sometimes referred to as
"the God Squad," would be empowered to authorize an otherwise prohibited project,
essentially allowing a species to risk extinction, provided the project meets certain criteria: (1)
it is a federal project of regional or national significance, (2) there are no reasonable and
prudent alternatives to the agency action, and (3) the benefits of the action dearly outweigh
the benefits of saving the endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
40. I-LR. REP. No. 2625 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1463.
41. The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divided the river into Upper and Lower basins.
The Upper Colorado River Basin includes "those parts of the states of Arizona, Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado
River System above Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said States located without the drainage
area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall hereafter be beneficially served by
waters diverted from the System above Lee Ferry." Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. II(f),
availableat http://www.glencanyon.org/Background/CRC.HTM (last visited June 17, 2001).
Since such a small portion of Arizona is included in this definition, Arizona is generally
considered a Lower Basin state, along with California and Nevada.
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first began experimenting with compromise approaches that used the ESA
more as a tool to elicit money for research than as a way to stop harmful
development.

THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
Endangered Fish Recovery Programs

Colorado River Watershed
Boundary
Critical Habitat for;
• Colorado pikeminnow
° Razorback sucker

New
Mexico
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A. ESA Implementation in the Upper Colorado River Basin
Soon after implementing regulations for the ESA were finalized in
1978, the FWS began Section 7 consultations with the BOR and other
agencies in the Upper Colorado River Basin to determine how existing and
proposed water projects would affect the viability and recovery of three
endangered native fish species: the Colorado pikeminnow,42 the humpback
chub, and the bonytail chub. Scientific knowledge about the native fishes
had grown slowly throughout the 1970s due to a lack of research funding
and low motivation within the agency,43 but nonetheless, between 1977 and
1981 the FWS determined that the operation of every major existing and
proposed water project in the Basin jeopardized or would jeopardize the
continued existence of the fish."
Not surprisingly, the water development community responded
with anger and concern. The first approach taken was to try to change the
law to minimize the effect of Section 7 on Colorado River water development. In the early 1980s, states and water users tried to amend the ESA to
exclude the Colorado fishes and the Colorado River Basin from the Act, but
they were unsuccessful."
The next strategy adopted by water developers was to take the
issue to court. In ColoradoRiver Water Conservation Districtet al. v. Watt, the
District filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior claiming that
construction of the mainstem Colorado River dams (Hoover, Glen Canyon,
Parker, etc.) had caused the plight of the Colorado River fishes and should,
therefore, be dismantled." The District had no intention of seeing the dams
removed but rather wished to use the lawsuit to compel the court to rule
that the ESA should not be applied to water projects in the Colorado River
Basin. In a Stipulation of Settlement, the Department of the Interior agreed,
among other things, to include water users in the consultation process.4 7

42. The Colorado pikeminnow was formerly known as the Colorado squawfish. The
American Fisheries Society changed its common name in 1998.
43. Ray Tenney, EndangeredFish Recovery: A Water Community Perspective,1999 PROC. AM.
WATER REsouRCEs ASS'N. ANN. WATER REsouRcEs CONF. Ill,

44.
45.
L. REV.
46.

112.

Zallen, supranote 21, at 41.
A. DanTarlock, The Endangered SpeciesActand Western WaterRights, 2OLAND& WATER
1,19 (1985).
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Watt, No. 78-A-1191 (D. Colo. filed Dec. 28,

1981).
47. StipulationofSettlement at 1-2, Colo. River WaterConservation Dist. v. Watt, No. 78A-1191 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 1983).
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At around the same time, consultation between the FWS and the
BOR in the early 1980s regarding the proposed Windy Gap Project set the
precedent for a new compromise approach to the conflict between
endangered species and water development. In exchange for a No Jeopardy
Opinion, the Municipal Subdistrict (the Front Range beneficiaries of the
Windy Gap Project) agreed to contribute $100,000 for a habitat manipulation project for the endangered fish and $450,000 over three years for field
research and habitat evaluation.49 This seed money provided the catalyst for
more research and the identification of flow needs for the listed fishes.
Department of Interior Solicitor Zallen observes that this approach to ESA
implementation was widely considered to be "interagency coercion," or
even "extortion."50 The subsequent improved understanding of the fishes'
needs (made possible by the seed money) resulted in nearly one hundred
Jeopardy Biological Opinions by 1984, effectively shutting down additional
water development.-"
The next approach to resolving the conflict was to try to develop a
negotiated agreement between the federal agencies, the states, and relevant
interest groups.52 Realizing their options were limited, water developers
took a greater interest in the problem and became more actively involved.
The Colorado Water Congress even established a Special Project on
Threatened and Endangered Species in 1983 that had as its goal to find an
administrative solution to the conflict that would allow water development
to continue while complying with the ESA.13 Meanwhile, the FWS began
developing a plan with the BOR; the states of Colorado, Utah, and
Wyoming; water developers; and environmentalists. These efforts led to the
formation of the Upper Colorado River Coordinating Committee in March
1984.
Early on, participants agreed to exclude the San Juan River from the
recovery program, even though it was technically part of the Upper

48. Windy Gap was a proposed supplement to the already constructed Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, which diverts water from the headwaters of the Colorado and pipes it
underneath the Continental Divide to supply the Front Range with water. See GREGORY M.
SILICENSON, WINDY GAP: TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIvERSiON AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL

MOVEMENT (Colo. Water Resources Res. Inst., Technical Rep. No. 61,1994).
49. Id. at 87.
50. Zallen, supranote 38.
51. Robert S. Wydoski & John Hamill, Evolution of a Cooperative Recovery Programfor
EndangeredFishes in the UpperColoradoRiver Basin, in BATrLEAGAINSTEXCnNCION: NATIVEFISH
MANAGEMEWINTHE AMERICAN WEST 123 (WendellL. Minckley &James E.Deacon eds., 1991);
Tenney, supra note 43, at 112-13.
52. See Wydoski &Hamill, supra note 51.
53. Tom Pitts, Conflict Resolution: EndangeredSpecies Protectionand Water Development in
the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin, COLO.WATER RIGHTS, Winter 1988, at 1-7.
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Colorado River Basin.54 This decision was made in large part because there
were no Jeopardy Opinions to deal with in the San Juan River Basin and the
state of New Mexico was therefore reluctant to participate when the process
began in 1984.55 Also, Upper Colorado interests knew it would be difficult
to negotiate with Steve Reynolds, New Mexico's state engineer at the time
and an avid states' rights proponent- ' The San Juan was also thought to
have unique issues since there were four tribes with reserved water rights
claims in the Basin.
The Upper Colorado Committee met for four years, discussing,
negotiating, and analyzing data, and eventually came up with a Recovery
Implementation Plan, which was adopted in 1988. s ' The recovery
program-which includes instream flow protection, habitat restoration,
installation of fish passage facilities, control of non-native fish, and
restocking native fish-was formally implemented via a cooperative
agreement between the governors of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming; the
administrator for the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA); and the
Secretary of the Interior.n '
The agreement created the ten-member Upper Colorado River
Implementation Committee to oversee the FWS recovery efforts.5 ' The
Recovery Implementation Program for Endangered Fish Species in the
Upper Colorado River Basin became the "reasonable and prudent alternative" to preventing the further operation of all the federal projects on the
river.' Twelve years and $75 million later, none of the fish have been
delisted, and it has become obvious that the recovery effort will take much
longer than anticipated. The effort to allow water development to continue,
however, has fared quite well. In spite of the Jeopardy Opinion for further
water development on the Colorado, over 270 projects have been permitted
in the three participating states with the recovery program serving as the
RPA. 61
The participants in the program are currently negotiating to secure
authorization and funding for an additional $80 million for further research
and capital projects and to extend the cooperative agreement that drives the
recovery program. Although it is unclear how effective the program has

54. U.S. FISH & WILDLIE SERV., SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY IMrLENTATION
PROGRAm DocumENT§ 1.4, at 5 (1995); Zallen, supra note 38.
55. Zallen, supra note 38.
56. Id.
57. DALE PoN U, COLORADO RIVERBASIN STUDY: REPORTTO THE WESTERN WATER PoucY
REvIEw ADVISORY COMMISSION 51-54 (1997). See also Wydoski & Hamil, supranote 51.
58. PoNTRIUS, supranote 57, at 51.

59. Zallen, supra note 38.
60. Id.
61.

Tenney, supra note 43, at 113.
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been to date in terms of restoring the fish,6 2 the Upper Colorado Program
is widely considered a "success," since it satisfies the Section 7 requirement,
yet still allows water development to proceed. It is seen as a desirable
alternative to traditional models of litigation and confrontation and has thus
been touted as a valuable model for implementing the ESA based on
principles of watershed management, cooperation, and consensus.' It has
been used as a model for ESA implementation challenges in other places,
like the San Juan River Basin."
B. Perspectives on the FWS Implementation of Section 7
While some observers applaud this "win-win" approach to ESA
implementation, some legal analysts have been critical of the FWS (and
NMFS) application of Section 7 to potentially harmful federal actions and
projects. Legal scholar J.B. Ruhl has noted that even though the court in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill described the plain meaning of Section 7 as
"to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy
of saving endangered species,"' it is just as plain that "that is not how the
agencies.. .historically have applied Section 7(a)(1)."" And while the plain
language of the ESA indicates that Biological Opinions are supposed to be
immune from considerations other than the welfare of the species in
question, 7 the fact remains that, in practice, they are heavily influenced by
other factors.'
As law professor and ESA expert Oliver Houck observes, "given
the rolling drumfire of criticism of Section 7 by federal agencies and their
commercial beneficiaries, one would expect to find a considerable rate of
decisions noting 'jeopardy' and 'adverse modification' of critical habitat,
and a steady stream of applications for the exemption process. The facts,
however, are otherwise." 6'9 Houck then goes on to cite two independent
studies conducted by the Government Accounting Office and the World

62.

PONTus, supra note 57, at 51-52; James H. Bolin, Of Razorbacks and Reservoirs: The

EndangeredSpecies Act's Protectionof EndangeredColoradoRiver Basin Fish,11 PAcEENVTLL. REV.
35, 41 (1993); Tenney, supra note 43, at 113.
63. Zallen, supra note 38.
64. See U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV., supranote 54.
65. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,185 (1978).
66. J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act; Rediscoveringand
Redefining the Untapped Power of FederalAgencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L.1107,
1135 (1995).
67. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
68. See Houck, supra note 7, at 317-29.
69. Id.at 317.
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Wildlife Fund 70 in 1992 showing that "the rate of decisions issuing from the
consultation process noting even potential jeopardy is low, and the number
of projects actually arrested by the ESA is nearly nonexistent."" More
specifically, the conclusions reached by both reports (as summarized by
Houck) were as follows:
(1) almost ninety percent of all consultations under the ESA
are disposed of informally and without fanfare; (2) over ninety
percent of the consultations concerning activities sufficiently
serious to be conducted formally resulted in findings of "no
jeopardy;" and (3) of those few that were conducted formally
and found potential "jeopardy," nearly ninety percent arrived
at reasonable and prudent alternativesthat allowed the project
to proceed."
Houck attributes these facts, in part, to "an extremely discretionary attitude
toward jeopardy reflected in Interior's regulations and practice."'
The ability of the FWS to find ways around prohibiting western
water development, in particular, is especially impressive, or alarming,
depending on one's perspective. Another GAO study, commissioned by
Congress out of concern that the ESA was impinging too much on western
water development, found just the opposite. Out of 3200 proposed western
water projects that had the potential to further jeopardize an already
endangered species, none were terminated and only 68 had to be modified
at all.' Regarding this report, Houck observes, "On their face, the findings
give rise to the suspicion that the biological agencies are bending over
backward to identify alternatives .... A common theme to all the [Biological]
Opinions reviewed was the Service's determination to find an alternative
within the economic means, authority, and ability of the applicant."'
Interestingly, the FWS looks at figures like these as a positive sign
that the Act is being implemented successfully. The following excerpt from
a 1999 FWS report titled "The Endangered Species Act at Twenty-Five"
characterizes the nature of the agency's pride in and commitment to
"improving" its approach to ESA implementation in recent years:

70.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTNG OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT TYPES AND NUMBER OF

IMPLEMENITNG ACTIONS (1992); WORLD WILDLIFEFUND, FOR CONERVING LISTED SPECIES, TAUC
LSCHEPERTHAN WETHINK: THECONSULTATIONPROCESSUNDERNTHEEDANGEREDSPECIESACT

(1992).
71.
72.
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Houck, supra note 7, at 317.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.
Houck, supranote 7, at 319-20.
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Despite some controversy, the incremental knowledge gained
through a quarter century of experience with the ESA has
enabled the Fish and Wildlife Service to review, validate, finetune, and implement creative reforms designed to improve
the ESA's effectiveness, while easing regulatory burdens on
landowners and businesses, and encouraging the development of partnerships to conserve species. As we look back
over the last 25 years of endangered species protection, we
can see that the implementation of the ESA has evolved in a
very positive way. The approaches of the early days of the
ESA-single species management, confrontation, and
rigidity-have given way to a multi-species/ecosystem focus,
landscape approaches to management, increased regulatory
flexibility, and a new sense of partnership. 76
Some would argue, however, that the ESA has not evolved in a positive
way, and that "innovative" approaches like "regulatory flexibility" and
"partnerships" with development interests tend to compromise the original
intentions of the Act. The FWS must walk a very fine line between adhering
to the letter of the law and being "flexible."
Historically, the FWS has relied on identifying reasonable and
prudent alternatives to questionable projects subject to Section 7 consultation as a way of minimizing the impact of the law and appeasing developers. The following passage from the 1999 FWS report reveals two important
things: (1) the agency's commitment to finding ways to allow development
in endangered species habitat to continue, and (2) its unquestioning faith in
the concept of the RPA and its capacity to fulfill the goals of the ESA.
Certainly the ESA's first 25 years have not been without
controversy-at times, intense controversy... .But in examining the facts, we find that economic development can be
compatible with the goals of the ESA. Of more than 145,000
Federal actions reviewed formally and informally between
1979 and 1992, only 69-or less than one-tenth of one
percent-resulted in a jeopardy decision where there was no
reasonable and prudent alternative for protecting the species.
This is an average of 2 of 11,000 projects reviewed annually.'
What is unsettling about this passage is that there seems to be no acknowledgement of the enormous role that agency discretion plays in the
formulation of these RPAs. In other words, just because the RPA approach
complies with the regulations (created by the FWS itself) for implementing
the law, it does not assure compliance with congressional intent-either in

76.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., The Endangered Species Act at 25 (1999) at 25.
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the original statute or thereafter-nor does it by any means guarantee a
happy ending for the species in question.
In his own review of 99 Jeopardy Biological Opinions and their
RPAs issued between 1988 and 1993, Houck found that, in general,
"alternatives strongly favored by the applicant and opposed by the Service
were, albeit grudgingly, accepted;" and "alternatives to avoid jeopardy
included a mix of measures neither surprising nor in many cases very
demanding."' Houck finds "recurring evidence that-whatever the
law-the alternatives found for controversial projects have been strongly
influenced by local and national politics.""'
There are several examples of questionable use of agency discretion
in the formulation of Biological Opinions and reasonable and prudent
alternatives under Section 7 that illustrate Houck's claims. In Mount Graham
Red Squirrel v. Madigan," for example, two FWS biologists testified that
during the consultation process regarding construction of an observatory
in the red squirrel's only habitat, they were instructed to find that the
squirrel would not be endangered. The court ultimately concluded that the
FWS regional director had mandated the inclusion of the selected alternative in the Final Biological Opinion "partly on non-biological considerations." 8 Similarly, the Denver regional FWS director reportedly stated,
before the biological studies were even complete, that he would insist on a
"No Jeopardy" ruling for the proposed Two Forks Dam. 2
Inthe same vein, a 1992 World Resources Institute report found
that "on numerous occasions, decisions to list species or issue jeopardy
opinions that were justified on biological grounds have been delayed or
reversed (inappropriately) due to political considerations."83 One of
Houck's main conclusions regarding the implementation of Section 7 is that
"the Department of Interior has been able to interpret the ESA through
regulations in ways that are probably unlawful, contrary to what Congress
thought it was enacting, and that have the effect of avoiding jeopardy under
Section 7 largely because Section 7 is never applied.""
Like Houck, legal scholar Michael Bean cites a "disquieting side"
to all the statistics showing no conflict between endangered species' needs
and development desires, observing that "the political pressures have often
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Houck, supranote 7, at 320-21.
Id. at 319.
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been too much for the Fish and Wildlife Service to bear." s5 He concludes
that the challenge for the endangered species program in its next fifteen
years will be "to restore the perception that decisions in the program are in
fact being made on the basis of the scientific criteria that the law demands
rather than in response to political pressures.""
These various perspectives and GAO findings call for a closer look
at how the ESA has been implemented, whether FWS implementation
strategies are doing justice to the original intent of the Act, and, if not, what
factors are contributing to the potentially questionable use of agency
discretion on the part of the FWS. In the following section I look at how
Section 7 was applied to the Animas-La Plata Project, focusing on methods
for developing an RPA, and then at some of the problems related to the
chosen approach.
III. SECTION 7 APPLIED TO THE ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT
Human modification of the Colorado River Basin ecosystem has led
to the decline of several native fish species and multiple listings under the
Endangered Species Act. Two of the listed species-the Colorado
pikeminnow and the razorback sucker-inhabit the San Juan River, a major
tributary to the Colorado River. At one point, the presence of these fish
threatened to halt further large scale water development in the basin, most
notably the proposed Animas-La Plata Project, which has been slated for
over 30 years to provide water for cities and agriculture and, more recently,
to satisfy the water claims of two Indian tribes in the Basin-the Southern
Utes and Ute Mountain Utes.
Sometimes referred to as "the last big water project in the West,"'
the Animas-La Plata Project (A-LP) has a long and complicated history,
most of which is beyond the scope of this article."s Suffice it to say that the
project, which would move water from the Animas River to the
neighboring La Plata River Basin, was authorized along with several other
Upper Basin projects in the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act.8 ' While
many other authorized western water projects fell by the wayside in the
1970s and 1980s due to a lack of federal funding and environmental
concerns, A-LP remains viable today largely because of its ties to the 1988

85. Bean, supra note 37, at 41-42.
86. Id.
87. See generally A REVIEW OF ANIMAS-LA PLATA: THE WEST'S LAST BIG WATER PROJECT
(HIGH COUNTRY NEWS ed., 1996).

88. For background on the project, see id. and MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:. THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 264-316 (1987).

89.

Pub. L No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (1968).
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Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act (CUIWRSA),o discussed
further in Section II.B.
This article focuses on A-LP's ESA consultation history, since it
provides an instructive example of the strengths and limitations of the FWS
approach to the Section 7 implementation process, and only delves into the
broader history of A-LP to the extent necessary to provide context for ESA
implementation.
A. The 1979 Biological Opinion
In 1978, the possible existence of a small population of Colorado
pikeminnow in the San Juan River led the BOR to initiate Section 7
consultation with the FWS on the potential effects of the proposed AnimasLa Plata project on the fish. The 1979 Final Biological Opinion concluded
that A-LP construction would indeed "further degrade the San Juan River
to a point that this population will be lost."" However, based on the capture
of only a single juvenile pikeminnow in the San Juan River near Aneth,
Utah, the FWS reasoned that "because of the apparent small size of the San
Juan River [pikeminnow] population and its already tenuous hold on
survival, its possible loss will have little impact on the successfully
reproducing Green and Colorado River [pikeminnow] populations and
therefore on the species itself."92 The FWS thus found no jeopardy for A-LP
in 1979."
The Opinion did, however, hold out some hope for the future,
recommending that (1) native fish populations of the San Juan River be
thoroughly surveyed, (2) the environmental needs of Colorado pikeminnow
be determined, (3) an attempt be made to meet the above needs by
adjusting projects on the San Juan drainage (Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project, Animas-La Plata Project, Gallup-Navajo Project, etc.) to the benefit
of the Colorado pikeminnow, and (4) artificial facilities in which to spawn
and rear Colorado pikeminnow be provided and funded until such time
that suitable habitats in the San Juan River can be developed and
maintained. 4
In spite of these recommendations to the BOR, little or no research
was conducted in the San Juan for several years. Meanwhile, perspectives
on the importance of the San Juan River to the overall recovery of the
pikeminnow were changing as the Upper Colorado Endangered Fish
90. Pub. L.No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
91. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Final Biological Opinion for the Animas-La Plata Project,
Colorado and New Mexico 5 (Dec. 28,1979) (on file with author).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5-6.
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Recovery Program got underway. 95 In a June 1985 memo, the FWS informed
the BOR that consultation on Animas-La Plata should be reinitiated based
on the availability of new information.96 A few months later, in September
1985, the Colorado River Fishes Recovery Team recommended to the FWS

that
the San Juan River be considered an integral part of the
Upper Colorado River Basin in its recovery efforts
[and]...that the Service encourage participation by the State
of New Mexico and other appropriate entities so that the San
Juan can be more fully incorporated into the Recovery Plans,
and subsequently, in Implementation plans."7
After discussing the possibility of reinitiating consultation on A-LP with the
BOR, the FWS agreed to delay reconsultation until additional field studies
were completed."
B. A-LP and the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act
Meanwhile, the Southern Ute and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribes,
who had been looking for a way to realize their federally reserved Winters
water rights since initiating litigation in the early 1970s," entered into
negotiations with A-LP proponents that eventually resulted in A-LP
becoming an "Indian project."'00
The Utes initiated litigation in 1972 to quantify their water rights in
the San Juan River Basin but decided to abandon the litigation approach in
95. See Memorandum from John Hamill, Colorado River Endangered Species Recovery
Coordinator, Region 6, to John Spinks, Fish and Wildlife Service Assistant Regional Director
(Dec. 4, 1987) (on file with the author).
96. Id.
97. Working Group on the Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights, Case Study
on the Upper Colorado River Basin 13-14 (July 28, 1999) (unpublished draft, on file with
author) [hereinafter Working Group].
98. Memorandum from John Hamill, supra note 95.
99. In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court ruled that tribes are
entitled to enough water to satisfy the purpose of the reservation and to a priority date equal
to the date their reservation was established. Thus, in most cases tribes have priority dates
senior to non-Indians. In terms of quantification, a later case determined that tribes would be
theoretically entitled to the amount of water necessary to irrigate all practicably irrigable
acreage on their reservations. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963). What
quickly became apparent is that Indian water rights would not always be accorded literal
interpretation. More than anything, it has been the threat of literal interpretation that has led
to creative negotiations and compromise between tribes and non-Indian water users.
100. For a more detailed analysis of the history of Indian water rights in the San Juan River
Basin and the negotiations surrounding CUIWRSA, see Adrian N. Hansen, The Endangered
Species Act and Extinction of Reserved Indian Water Rights on the San Juan River, 37ARIZ. L. REV.

1305 (1995).
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1984 when the state of Colorado proposed a negotiated settlement.
Settlement discussions began in November of 1984 and continued through
1985 in Durango, Colorado, and on both reservations. The sessions often
included in excess of 100 people, with representatives from the tribes, the
states of Colorado and New Mexico, the Departments of Justice and
Interior, local municipalities, and water user entities. Central to the
discussions was the potential for the tribes to use water from one or both of
two major BOR projects: the Dolores Project, which was nearing completion
at the time; and A-LP, which had yet to begin construction."'
The incorporation of tribal water rights into these formerly nonIndian projects was deemed critical because existing supplies were
insufficient to meet the needs of both Indians and non-Indians. Many of the
rivers and streams to which the tribes laid claim were already overappropriated."' If the tribes were not somehow incorporated into existing
projects, A-LP proponents argued, providing wet water to them would
inevitably displace existing water users, a politically unacceptable
prospect.'03
In 1986, the negotiations resulted in a proposed Colorado Ute
Indian Water Rights Settlement. After a lengthy period of fine-tuning, the
agreement was made official in 1988, when the Colorado Ute Indian Water
Rights Settlement Act (CUIWRSA) was passed by Congress and signed into
law." In the final agreement, the tribes would give up their water claims
on certain streams in exchange for approximately one-third of the water to
be diverted annually by A-LP. The Ute Mountain Utes would also be
authorized to receive water from the nearby Dolores Project.
The tribal component of A-LP would be realized in Phase II, which,
unfortunately, would not be federally funded and would be constructed
"when deemed practicable" by one or more of the parties to the 1986 costsharing agreement.0 5 The money for Phase II, estimated at over $100
million, would have to come from the tribes themselves, the state of
Colorado, and local interests.'"' The federal government would pay the

101. Lois G. Witte, Negotiating an Indian Water Rights Settlement- The Colorado Ute
Experience 4 (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Innovation in Western Water Law and
Management Symposium, June 5-7,1991) (on file with author).
102. Id.at 5.
103. Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
105. U.S. GEN. AcCOuNTING OFFCE, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT: STATUS AND LEGISLATiVE
FRAMEWORK, GAO/RCED-96-1, at 13 (1995).

106. "The nonfederal parties who signed the cost-share agreement are the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe, the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe, the State of Colorado, Montezuma County,
the Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy District, the New Mexico Interstate Stream
Commission, and the San Juan Water Commission." Id. at 13 n.3.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

tribes' share of project costs until water was first used.107 The agreement
further stated that certain parts of A-LP had to be completed by January 1,
2000, or else the tribes would have the right to reopen litigation of their
reserved water rights claims until 2005.11
According to one observer, the settlement was "a model of
successful cooperation and preservation of harmonious Indian and nonIndian relations."""1 It also gave A-LP a new identity as an "Indian project,"
which made it privy to strong support from state and federal governments
in the 1990s, in spite of ongoing fiscal and environmental problems. The
prevailing sentiment amongst many politicians has been that A-LP must be
built to do justice to the Colorado Ute Tribes.'
It is important to remember that while the FWS had indicated some
interest in reinitiating consultation on A-LP and rethinking the 1979 No
Jeopardy Opinion before the passage of CUIWRSA, the general assumption
amongst negotiators seemed to be that the ESA would not be an obstacle to
A-LP construction."I This assumption would soon prove to be false.
C. The 1987-1989 San Juan River Fisheries Surveys
In 1987, the BOR finally began surveying the San Juan River, as
required by the 1979 Biological Opinion for A-LP and in response to the
Fish and Wildlife Service's desire for more data.'1 2 The surveys were
conducted between 1987 and 1989 and resulted in several surprising
discoveries that exceeded most biologists' expectations: (1) Colorado
pikeminnow existed in several locations between Shiprock, New Mexico,
and Lake Powell; (2) the fish were successfully reproducing, as evidenced
by the collection of 18 young-of-year fish in 1987 and 1988; and (3) suitable

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Witte, supra note 101, at 2.
See, e.g., Ellen Miller, Lujan "sympathetic" to A-LP, DURANcO HERALD, May 10, 1990;
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2001).
111. I could find no mention of the role a reconsultation on the status of endangered fish
in the San Juan might play in the implementation of CUIWRSA in documents leading up to

CUIWRSA.
112. Memorandum from John Hamill, supra note 95; Interview with David L. Propst,
Endangered Species Biologist, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, in Albuquerque,

N.M. (Jan. 11, 2000).
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pikeninnow habitat was evident throughout the San Juan River on a yearround basis."3
These findings were received with mixed emotions from the
community in the San Juan River Basin. As Colorado River Endangered
Species Recovery Coordinator John Hamill wrote after the first survey in
1987, "I believe the findings indicate that the San Juan River may have
significant recovery potential for the Colorado [pikeminnow] that needs to
be further explored. The States of Utah and New Mexico and Reclamation
(reluctantly) agree with this conclusion."""
Obviously, environmentalists were thrilled that viable populations
of fish had been found, and on September 15, 1989, Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund (SCLDF) attorneys Lori Potter and Federico Cheever wrote
to the Bureau of Reclamation"' reminding them that the ESA required the
reinitiation of consultation when new information regarding a listed species
was discovered." 6 The BOR responded to the SCLDF letter in October of
1989, indicating that it was still reserving judgment on whether the new
surveys would qualify as "new information" revealing effects "not
previously considered."" 7 Nonetheless, A-LP supporters, in the midst of
planning8 an A-LP groundbreaking ceremony for May 1990, sensed trouble
ahead."
Apparently, the SCLDF letter was threatening enough that the BOR
felt compelled to reinitiate consultation, in spite of objections from A-LP
proponents like Sam Maynes, legal counsel for the Southern Utes, and the
Southwest Water Conservation District. According to Maynes, who would

113. See generally STEVEN P. PLATANIA & DOUGLAS A. YOUNG, A SuRvEy OFTHE
ICHTHYOFAUNA OF THE SAN JUAN AND ANIMAS RIVER FROM ARCHULETA AND CEDAR HILL,
(RESPEcTVELY), To THEIR CONFLUENCE AT FARMINGION, NEw MEXIco (1989); STEVEN P.
PLATANIA, BIOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE 1987 To 1989 NEW MEXICO-UTAH ICHTHYOFAUNA
STUDYOFTHE SANJUAN RIVER (1990); Memorandum from John Hamill, supranote 95; Interview
with Steven P. Platania, Professor of Biology, Univ. of New Mexico, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Jan.

11, 2000).
114. Memorandum from John Hamill, supra note 95.
115. Letter from Lori Potter & Federico Cheever, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
Attorneys, to Reed Harris, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Sept. 15,1989) (on file with author).
116. By law, a federal agency must resume consultation with the FWS "if new information
reveals that effects of the agency's actions may affect listed species or critical habitat in a
manner or to an extent not previously considered." 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2000). See also Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.1987).
117. Letter from Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of
Reclamation, to FedericoCheever, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund Attorney (Oct. 16,1989) (on
file with author).
118. Letter from Frank "Sam" Maynes, Southwest Water Conservation District Attorney,
to Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of Reclamation (an. 2,
1990) (on file with author).
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rather have taken his chances in court against SCLDF, 119 the BOR assured
him that reconsultation would have little effect on the project.' On
February 6,1990, the BOR contacted the FWS, requesting reconsultation on
the likely effects of A-LP on the pikeminnow.12
D. The 1990 Draft Biological Opinion
During the early phases of the reconsultation, FWS biologist Keith
Rose, in charge of preparing the Biological Opinion, looked at the new
information about pikeminnow populations in the SanJuan and determined
that A-LP, as proposed, would indeed jeopardize the fish," He determined
that because of already existing projects in the San Juan Basin, flows in the
San Juan River were already "at or below the threshold for minimum flows
whereby the fish could survive in the river.""' Of particular concern was ALP's projected effect on water levels in the mainstem San Juan, especially
its effect on spring flows necessary for spawning. He further determined
that the population was significant enough that it could not be written off,
as the 1979 Opinion had done." This conclusion stemmed at least in part
from an April 16, 1990, determination by the Colorado River Fishes
Recovery Team that the San Juan River should be included in the Recovery
Plan objectives for removing the species from the list of endangered and
threatened species." Table 1 contains excerpts from the 1990 Opinion
regarding A-LP's projected impact on the fish.

119. Maynes downplayed the significance of the surveys, arguing, "the finding of youngof-year cannot be considered new information, because the Service was aware in 1979 that
spawning occurred in the San Juan River." Barry Smith, A-LP Backers, Opponents Plan New
Strategies,THE DURANGO HERALD, May 10, 1990, at Al. He then went on to cite the 1980 EIS
that had reported that a survey crew had located a "juvenile squawfish" in the San Juan River
in 1978. It apparently had spawned in the river in 1975 or 1976. Id.
120. Interview with Frank "Sam" Maynes, Southwest Water Conservation District
Attorney, in Durango, Colo. (an. 11, 2000).
121. Letter from Acting Regional Director, Upper Colorado Regional Office, Bureau of

Reclamation, to Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Feb. 6,1990) (on
file with author).
122. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Draft Biological Opinion for the Animas-La Plata Project,
Colorado and New Mexico 25 (May 4,1990) (on file with author).
123. Id. at 22.
124. Id. at 14-16.
125. Id. at 16.
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Table 1: Excerpts from 1990 Draft Biological Opinion (the Naked
Jeopardy Opinion) Regarding Projected Impacts of Animas-La Plata
"This Biological Opinion is based on the full project development scenario as
requested by the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau estimates that the
Animas-La Plata Project would result in a net average annual depletion of
154,800 acre-feet of water from the two rivers. The Animas and La Plata
Rivers are tributaries to the San Juan River which is inhabited by a
reproducing population of Colorado [pikeminnow]." (4)*
"Water depletions in the Upper Colorado River Basin (UCRB) have long
been recognized as a major source of impact to endangered fish species.
Continued withdrawal of water throughout the Basin has restricted the ability
of the Colorado River system to produce flow conditions required by various
life stages of the fish. Since 1942 numerous impoundments and diversions
have altered the shape of natural hydrographs by reducing peak discharges by
as much as 50 percent in some reaches while doubling base flows in other
reaches. Significant depletions to flows of the San Juan River of up to 45
percent during the peak runoff period have already occurred as a result of
major water development projects, including Navajo Reservoir, San Juan
Chama Project and the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project." (6)
"Depletions, along with a number of other factors, have resulted in such
drastic reductions in populations of Colorado [pikeminnow] that the Service
has listed this species as endangered throughout its entire range, with the
exception of the Salt and Verde River drainages in Arizona where attempted
reintroductions of endangered fishes have been classified as non-essential,
experimental populations." (6)
"Recent field studies (Platania et al. 1990) document a greater number of
Colorado [pikeminnow] (adults and young-of-year) in the San Juan than
were previously known to occur. The San Juan River is one of only three
remaining areas where a wild, reproducing population of Colorado
[pikeminnow) still persists. As the southernmost tributary in the Upper
Colorado River Basin, the San Juan peaks earlier in the year and attains
warmer water temperatures than other UCRB streams and is conducive to
longer and better growth potential for young Colorado [pikeminnow]. Any
additional loss or further degradation of remaining habitats of the San Juan
River will exacerbate problems the species is currently experiencing in the
San Juan and throughout the Upper Colorado River Basin." (14)
* Numbers in parentheses indicate page numbers in the Opinion.
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Table I (Continued)
"Protection and enhancement of the San Juan River could provide
additional protection against possible extinction of the Colorado
[pikeminnow] while reducing total dependency on the Colorado and Green
River systems for survival and recovery. The San Juan sub-basin is
geographically isolated from the Colorado and Green River sub-basins,
provides a third population of wild fish, and thus, adds an additional buffer
against a catastrophic event (such as an oil spill) or future project
developments elsewhere in the basin." (14)
"The Animas-La Plata Project will cause discrete, identifiable, additive,
adverse impacts to the San Juan River endangered fishes. As shown in the
flow analysis, the project will cause flow depletions in addition to existing
projects which will further alter historic flow regimes." (20)
"In summary, further flow reductions in the San Juan River are likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of the Colorado [pikeminnow]. There
are existing data suggesting that wild populations of Colorado
[pikeminnow] in the Colorado River sub-basin are continuing to decline
and may not be recoverable. The last remaining stronghold for the species is
the Green River sub-basin, however, even there they do not appear to be
increasing in numbers. Any catastrophic event there could result in severe
impacts to Green River sub-basin populations to the point of being lost and
unrecoverable. The San Juan River is an essential component of the
Colorado River Basin to ensure maintenance of a population of Colorado
[pikeminnow] in the event populations are lost in the Green River sub-basin
and/or Colorado River sub-basin." (21)
* Numbers in parentheses indicate page numbers in the Opinion.

The FWS thus issued a Draft Biological Opinion on May 4,
1990-two weeks before the scheduled groundbreaking ceremony for ALP-that concluded that the project was likely, after all, to jeopardize the
continued existence of the pikeminnow.1" The Opinion relates how, "in
pursuit of attempting to identify reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
proposed project," the FWS "queried the Bureau as to existing flexibility
within Animas-La Plata Project features" to benefit Colorado pikeminnow
in the San Juan. 7 The BOR responded that "there was not any project

126. Id. at 25.
127. Id. at 21-22.
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flexibility."'O Thus, the FWS looked for alternatives that would allow the
full project as initially conceived.
After reviewing several possibilities (see Table 2), the FWS
concluded that none were defensible. (See Table 3 for excerpts from the
1990 Opinion regarding consideration of these alternatives.) The agency
then recommended that further water depletions in the San Juan River not
occur until additional studies were conducted to develop a more complete
database, especially on streamflow needs for the fish in the San Juan.1" This
was the first and only "naked" Jeopardy Opinion (a Jeopardy Opinion with
no RPAs) ever issued by Region 6.130
The 1990 Draft Biological Opinion essentially placed A-LP on hold
until further studies could be conducted, which instigated a major outcry
from project supporters including the Colorado and New Mexico congressional delegations, the governor of Colorado, and the Southern Ute and Ute
Mountain Ute Tribes, who, because of the CUIWRSA, were dependent on
A-LP for the realization of their water claims. Secretary of the Interior
Manuel Lujan also criticized the FWS opinion and even recommended that
Congress amend the ESA to allow consideration of economic factors in the
Section 7 consultation process.'31 The Opinion was especially offensive to
those who had only two years earlier labored with the Department of the
Interior to reach an agreement with the two tribes in the Basin regarding
their reserved water rights-an agreement that hinged on the construction
of A-LP.1 32
The Department of the Interior was put in a difficult position, since
it was obligated to protect, on the one hand, the interests of the Utes (via the
Bureau of Indian Affairs) and, on the other hand, the welfare of the fish (via
the Fish and Wildlife Service). Interestingly, the Department had historically been in the habit of prioritizing the needs and desires of yet a third
agency under its authority, the Bureau of Reclamation, often at the expense
of other interests." Endangered fish and Indian water rights were not new
concerns for the Department, but to have to manage them in concert and in
conflict with each other was indeed a new challenge.

128. Id.at 22.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Interview with Keith Rose, supra note 9.
131. Wydoski &Hamill, supranote 51, at 132.
132. Witte, supranote 101, at 14.
133. For a history of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Interior's
implementation of reclamation law, see generally REtSNER, supra note 88.
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Table 2: Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives Considered in the 1990
Draft Biological Opinion (The Naked Jeopardy Opinion)*
1) Flexibility in A-LP project features and/or potential design changes
that would allow for reoperation of project storage facilities to benefit
Colorado [pikeminnow] in the San Juan River.
The Service was interested in this alternative, but "the Bureau responded
that there was not any project flexibility and that if they released water from
storage, it would necessitate pumping additional water out of the Animas
River to refill project reservoirs."
2) Use of Navajo Dam as a possible means of offsetting project impacts,
since it is a BOR facility and is situated on the San Juan River
upstream of occupied habitats.
"The Service took the preliminary position that since A-LP would annually
deplete 154,800 acre-feet of water from the San Juan sub-basin, the Bureau
should provide that same amount of water back to the San Juan River via
releases from Navajo Dam." *
"The Bureau proposed an alternative to the Service position that would
replace project depletions, totaling 90,800 acre-feet of water in April, May,
June, and July only. The remaining eight months of the year (AugustMarch) the Bureau would not release water from Navajo Dam to offset
project depletions." The FWS found this alternative unacceptable.
3) Phasing project depletion
construction schedule.

replacements

consistent with the

"Since A-LP would be constructed in phases (i.e., Phase I: Ridges Basin
Dam, Reservoir and associated conveyance facilities; and Phase II:
Southern Ute Dam, Reservoir and associated conveyance facilities), an
additional option considered was offsetting project depletions associated
with Phase I(111,200 to 138,300 acre-feet) which would be completed by
the year 2000; and then use the results of continued biological studies
which would be done concurrently with construction of Phase I to formulate
any additional needs that may accrue as a result of Phase 2."
The Service considered this option but determined that biological and
hydrological ramifications made it indefensible. "The concept of replacing
water depleted as a result of the Animas-La Plata Project with water stored
in Navajo Reservoir still results in a net depletion in the San Juan sub-basin
and would further reduce flows in the San Juan River commensurate with
project depletions, and therefore within occupied habitats for Colorado

[pikeminnow]."
* U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1990,21-22.
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Table 3: Excerpts from 1990 Draft Biological Opinion (the Naked
Jeopardy Opinion) Regarding Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives
Considered*
"As the biological and hydrological ramifications of the three options were
discussed, it was realized that none were defensible. Since the Service
believes that in most years the river is already at or below the threshold for
minimum flows whereby the fish could survive in the river, any further
depletions to the river system could render the San Juan unusable by the
Colorado [pikefish]." (22)
"Additional discussions continued, however, no solutions or additional
alternatives were identified." (22)
"It appears that there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives that can be
implemented in a manner consistent with the intended purposes of the
Animas-La Plata Project, and within the Bureau's legal authority and
jurisdiction that are economically and technically feasible, that the Service
believes would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence
of the Colorado [pikefish]." (22)
"This opinion was based upon the best scientific and commercial data
available as described herein. If new information becomes available (such
as results of the proposed studies) or if new species are listed, then formal
Section 7 consultation should be reinitiated." (25)
*Numbers in parentheses indicate page numbers in the Opinion.

The BOR's first response to the 1990 Draft Biological Opinion was
that further discussions with the FWS regarding the possibility of a
reasonable and prudent alternative to A-LP were pointless. In a handwritten internal memo, BOR employee Wayne Cook related to his colleagues
how he responded to the FWS determination during a departmental
briefing on the Draft Biological Opinion:
We indicated that they should not expect anything fruitful
coming out of additionaldiscussions between the Bureau and
the FWS, that we had already suggested prudent alternatives
and they were rejected! We need no additional time to
discuss. Our opinion should be that the FWS may as well
make the opinion final, that it appears to us that we cannot
comply with the Service's opinion and meet existing obligations in the San Juan River Drainage (i.e. UIT contract, NIIP
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[Navajo Indian Irrigation Project] development, Jicarilla, Ute,
and Soluthem Ute [I]ndian water right settlements, etc.) and
that there may be no other alternative than to seek an exemption as soon as possible under the Endangered Species Act.13
The BOR eventually concluded, however, that the exemption process would
be a lengthy ordeal with questionable outcome and that their options were
somewhat limited." s The search for an RPA would thus continue.
E. The Search for a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative
In an effort to avert what many perceived would be a "regional
social and economic disaster,"" the BOR wrote to the FWS, outlining a new
approach:
the concept of "no net depletion" on the San Juan River is
contrary to the spirit of cooperation we enjoy in the RIP
[Upper Colorado Recovery Implementation Program] and is
a complete departure from [the 1979 Opinion] .... A program
which would allow continued use of the San Juan River by
residents of Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico while protecting fishes downstream must therefore be developed.1
To that end, the BOR invited various San Juan River Basin water interests
(including state and federal representatives, academics, consultants, and
environmental groups) to help them determine if an acceptable RPA could
be developed during the summer of 199o.'3 it is interesting to note here that
the FWS was apparently reluctant to participate in the search for an RPA,
since it had already gone through the process of trying to identify an RPA
with the BOR during the consultation process 3 9 As a result, the BOR took
the lead on searching for an RPA that would be acceptable to the FWS, and
the FWS played a relatively passive role throughout negotiations over the
next year-and-a-half, in spite of the court's ruling that the consulting agency
should take the lead in the identification of RPAs.

134. Memorandum from Wayne Cook to Rick Gold &Wes Hirsche, Bureau of Reclamation
employees, Roland Robison, Regional Director (May 8, 1990) (emphasis in original) (on file
with author).
135. Bureau of Reclamation, Animas-La Plata ESA Section 7 Consultation (Summer 1990)
(unpublished meeting notes, on file with author).
136. Witte, supra note 101, at 14.
137. Letter fromRoland Robison toGalen Buterbaugh, Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife
Serv. (July 17,1990) (on file with author).
138. Memorandum from Wayne Cook, Upper Colorado Regional Office, Bureau of
Reclamation, Max Stodolski, Upper Colorado Regional Office, Bureau of Reclamation (June
6, 1990) (on file with author).
139. Interview with David L. Propst, supra note 112.
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The BOR eventually established three teams to help it identify an
RPA: a Biology Team, a Hydrology Team, and a Legal Team. The Biology
Team played the biggest role in the process, since it had to grapple with the
issue of whether the fish could tolerate any further depletions, in spite of
the FWS findings in the 1990 Draft Biological Opinion.
The first meeting of the Biology Team was held in Las Vegas,
Nevada, on June 13, 1990. Two key biologists, David Propst of the New
Mexico Department of Game and Fish and Steven Platania of the University
of New Mexico (both of whom worked on the 1987-1989 surveys) chose not
to attend. The biologists who attended listened to a BOR hydrologist and a
BOR biologist describe San Juan River and A-LP hydrology and biology.
They then discussed the facts and came to a tentative consensus that (1)
protection of the San Juan River population is not only desirable but
probably essential to preclude extinction and promote recovery,"4 and (2)
preventing depletion of water from the San Juan Basin was not as critical to
survival of the fish as was using operational flexibility at Navajo Dam to
provide flows once habitat needs were determined; therefore "some
reasonable and prudent alternatives probably exist which would preclude
jeopardy to the species."14 It was agreed that the principle alternative that
needed to be explored was the flexibility of Navajo Dam and whether
sufficient water was available to offset the effective depletion of A-LP and
enhance runoff flows.Y Participants indicated, however, that they wanted
to think more about the discussions and then spend some additional time
together to come to consensusY 3
The Biology Team met again on June 25 and 26,1990, in Park City,
Utah. At this meeting, the biologists came to agreement on several points:

140. Richard Valdez, Senior AquaticEcologist, Bio/West, and BiologicalConsultant for the
SWWCD, distinguished the relative importance of the San Juan to the pikeminnow and the
razorback sucker as follows:
Although losing this small population [of pikeminnow] would probably not
impact the existence of the species in other areas, the San Juan River
population should be considered important because it may constitute a
unique genetic strain and itprovides an additional population for the system
The continued existence of the razorback sucker in the San Juan River
[however] is essential to the continued existence of the species basinwide.
Because this species is not reproducing in the wild in the [Uipper [B]asin and
numbers seem to be declining, maintenance of as many genetic stocks as
possible is important until causes for decline are identified.
Richard Valdez, Answers to Animas-La Plata Biological Opinion Questionnaire I (June 18,
1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
141. Memorandum from Reed Harris, Biological Support Branch, Upper Colorado
Regional Office, Bureau of Reclamation, to Bureau of Reclamation Regional Director Roland
Robison (June 20,1990) (on file with author).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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the Draft Biological Opinion accurately reflected the current status of the
two fish species in the San Juan River; the Jeopardy Opinion was warranted;
and the San Juan population of fishes were essential to the recovery of the
species.'44 The team grappled, however, with the question of whether an
RPA could be developed that would offset the impacts of A-LP on the
pikeminnow. 45
Not all of the biologists agreed that an RPA could be identified, a
situation that caused great concern for A-LP proponents.1 " Several team
members emphasized the need to conduct additional studies on the rivers
and look at specific alternatives to the construction of A-LP before any
decision could be made. 47 Even Rich Valdez, an independent biologist/consultant who had been hired by the Southwest Water Conservation
District (SWWCD) to help find an RPA, admitted the following in a letter
to his client's attorney, Sam Maynes:
I thought.. .that we might be able to formulate some alternatives, but after learning more about the hydrology of the San
Juan River, the possible availability of water from Navajo
Reservoir, and concerns from the field biologists, I concluded
that it would be premature for me to formalize alternatives.'"
The Biology Team met several times over the course of the summer
and fall of 1990 and eventually began to formulate an RPA that was
modeled on the one used in the Upper Colorado River, where limited water
development was allowed to proceed while a recovery program took
place. 9 On September 28,1990, the BOR wrote to the FWS with a tentative
RPA and a plan to finalize the alternative over the next few months."5 The
basic idea was that at least the first part of A-LP could be built while a
research and recovery program simultaneously recovered the fish, using
Navajo Dam and Reservoir to mimic a more natural hydrograph.
Interestingly, the BOR had significantly modified its stance
regarding flexibility in the proposed project, stating that it was now willing
to consider an RPA that would initially limit A-LP construction to Ridges

144. Memorandum from Reed Harris to Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office
Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Summer 1990) (on file with author).
145. See id.; Letter from Richard A. Valdez, Senior Aquatic Ecologist, Bio/West, Inc., to
Frank "Sam" Maynes, Southwest Water Conservation District Attorney (July 13,1990) (on file
with author); Interview with David L. Propst, supra note 112.
146. Letter from Richard Valdez, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Memorandum from Roland Robison, Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation, to
Galen Buterbaugh, Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife Serv. (Sept. 28, 1990) (on fie with
author).
150. Id.
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Basin Reservoir, the Durango Pumping Plant, and the inlet pipeline, with
a net depletion of 50,000 acre-feet, rather than the full project it had insisted
on during negotiations leading up to the Draft Biological Opinion."' The
BOR had also discovered that there was mote flexibility in existing San Juan
River operations than previously thought. Specifically, the BOR concluded
the following:
" New hydrological information suggested that there is additional flexibility in the operations of the Navajo Dam. By
reducing late fall and winter releases, water could be made
available to increase spring peaks and return the San Juan River
to a more natural hydrograph that would mimic historical flow
conditions.
" Updated hydrology modeling indicated that approximately
300,000 acre feet of water could be made available from the
Navajo reservoir operation to re-create the spring peak flows in
the San Juan River.
* The San Juan River population of endangered fish is important
to the survival and recovery of the species.
" In addition to flow depletions, other conditions presently
occurring in the San Juan River, including proliferation of
nonnative species, water quality degradation, the blocking of
migration routes, and loss of riparian areas, are extremely
detrimental to the survival and recovery of the endangered
153
fish.
Armed with new flexibility and a broader perspective on the possibility for
compromise, the BOR expressed confidence that an RPA might still be
identified that would allow A-LP to go forward."M
To better refine these ideas-with the purpose of developing a
viable RPA-the BOR held a series of three general meetings over the
course of the next two months. Minutes from the meeting held on October
9,1990, in Salt Lake City, Utah, indicate how the BOR explicitly reminded
the group that the purpose of the meeting was to develop "a potential
alternative to the Jeopardy Opinion" for A-LP, not to the project itself.10 "We
stressed the fact that we were not here to discuss the pros and cons of the
project, the Endangered Species Act, or any other subjects not directly
151.
152.

Id.
Id.

153. id.
154. Id.
155. Letter from Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of
Reclamation to Interested Parties (Oct. 12, 1990) (on file with author).
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related to the tasks at hand."1" The group adjourned, agreeing that each of
the three teams would meet independently before October 23, 1990, and
then report back to the second general meeting on November 2, 1990, in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 5
The Biology Team next met on October 22 and 23,1990, in Denver,
Colorado, to discuss the biological basis of the Draft Biological Opinion and
to determine if there was any "defensible" biological basis to support an
RPA. Bob Williams, the BOR biologist chairing the meeting, again made it
clear that the BOR was not seeking advice or recommendations but, rather,
simply wanted "expert opinion" on technical issues."
Much of the team's discussion centered on the difficulty of
identifying an alternative in the face of the many unknowns and the
uncertainty of available water after full depletion.'" The team then raised
its concerns with the direction in which the BOR appeared to be heading
with its proposed RPA.W The primary concern was that an RPA including
or requiring full depletion would be accepted without understanding more
about the fish, why they are declining, and what chemical/physical factors
have led to their decline. 161 The team spent the better part of the remainder
of the meeting discussing research that would be needed to mitigate the
scientific uncertainty."2
The three teams met again as a group at the second of the three
general meetings on November 2,1990, in Albuquerque to review progress
made towards a reasonable and prudent alternative. Again, in its minutes
of the meeting, the BOR recounts how "we reiterated that the purpose of
the meeting was to find an alternative to the Jeopardy Opinion and not an
alternative to the Animas-La Plata project."" These continual reminders
suggest that some team members still felt that there might be non-A-LP
alternatives that might serve the purpose of the project. Indeed, New
Mexico Game and Fish biologist David Propst recalls how his suggestions
regarding alternatives to A-LP were continually quashed: "They made it
very clear that a non-A-LP alternative was not an option."'" This explains
in large part the ongoing absence of any representatives from environmen-

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Draft Minutes, San Juan River/Animas-La Plata Project Biology Team (Oct. 22-23,
1990, Denver, Colo.) (on file with author).
159, [d.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Letter from Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of
Reclamation, to All Interested Parties (Nov. 8, 1990) (on file with author).
164. Interview with David L Propst, supra note 112.
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tal groups during these meetings. The environmental groups felt that
participating in the search for an RPA would be a waste of their time if the
full range of alternatives was not going to be considered."~
The November 19, 1990, meeting was the last of the three general
meetings regarding the formulation of an RPA for A-LP. After agreeing on
an RPA, participants then turned to the task of developing the Recovery
Implementation Program (RIP) that would serve as the centerpiece of the
RPA.16' On November 27, 1990, the FWS sent out a letter to interested
parties requesting comments on and participation in the development of16a7
San Juan River Endangered Fishes Recovery Implementation Program.
Several members of the environmental community received the letter, but,
for reasons described below, they declined to participate.
In a letter to Robert Jacobsen, Assistant Regional Director of the
FWS, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund attorney Lori Potter (representing
several environmental organizations) wrote,
We are not persuaded that it is in the interest of the environmental community to participate in development of a
[recovery] program, since it seems driven more by a desire to
relieve the Animas-La Plata project from the requirements of
the Endangered Species Act than by the need to recover the
endangered fish. It appears to us that the alternative of not
building the Animas-La Plata project at all or at least deferring construction of one of its principal features, the Ridges
Basin Reservoir, until the feasibility of recovering the fish is
known, is not on the table.M
The letter went on to argue that the approach taken in the Upper
Colorado-allowing water development to proceed concurrently with a
recovery program-was inappropriate for the San Juan for several reasons.
The proposed water depletions in the San Juan were on a much larger scale
than those allowed in the Upper Colorado under the RPA. In addition, there
were too many uncertainties associated with the proposal to use water from
Navajo Reservoir to make up for A-LP depletions.
In spite of opposition from the environmental community, the FWS
and BOR continued work on the development of an RIP and a final RPA.
On December 6 and 7, 1990, the Biology Team met in Albuquerque to
finalize their contributions to the RPA. Each biologist was asked to "sign
165. Interview with Andrew Caputo, former Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund Attorney
(Sept. 29,1999); Letter from Lori Potter et al. to Robert Jacobsen, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Assistant Regional Director (Dec. 12, 1990) (on file with author).
166. Memorandum from Rick Gold, for Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office
Director, Bureau of Reclamation, to All Interested Parties (Dec. 5,1990) (on file with author).
167. Letter from Lori Potter etal., supra note 165.
168. Id.
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off" on the alternative they had developed as a group. Some signed off with
"qualifications," but all agreed fundamentally that their RPA would offset
the impacts of the project and prevent jeopardy.'69
On March 4, 1991, the BOR sent the FWS a letter outlining its
proposed RPA. The BOR asserted that its alternative "would mitigate all
impacts of the proposed construction of A-LP."" ° After "independent
evaluation" of the BOR's proposal, the FWS issued a Revised Draft
Biological Opinion, dated March 21, 1991, that incorporated the Bureau's
alternative with a few modifications. The Opinion stated that if all elements
of the RPA were fully implemented, the likelihood of jeopardy to the
endangered fish would be avoided."" Again, it must be noted here that it
was the action agency, not the consulting agency, that led the search for an
acceptable ESA implementation strategy. The FWS limited its involvement
to reviewing what the BOR handed them.
F. Problems with the Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the
RPA
Since the RPA did end up including implementation of a recovery
program, the next challenge was to get all parties involved to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the RPA and the
proposed San Juan Recovery Implementation Program (SJRIP) before the
Final Biological Opinion could be issued. The Navajo Nation, another tribe
in the San Juan River Basin, was reluctant to sign the MOU because of
concerns about how A-LP and the SJRIP would affect its own federal
project, the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP), and its San Juan water
rights in general. President Peterson Zah even went so far as to announce
in Durango that the Navajo were not willing to support the RPA and the
construction of A-LP without the prior completion of NIIP and other tribal
ventures.in
Without the Navajo's legal commitment to the SJRIP, the FWS was
reluctant to issue a Final Biological Opinion for A-LP, since the proposed
RPA depended on the protection of releases from Navajo Reservoir through

169. Memorandum from Roland Robison, Upper Colorado Regional Office Director,
Bureau of Reclamation, to Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Mar. 4,
1991) (on file with author).
170. Id.; See also Witte, supra note 101, at 15.
171. Memorandum from the Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
to Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of Reclamation 4 (Mar. 29 1991) (on file
with author).
172. Letter from Leonard C. Burch, Chairman, Southern Ute Tribe & Judy Knight-Frank,
Chairwoman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, to Max Stodolski, Projects Manager, Bureau of
Reclamation (May 17, 1991) (on file with author).
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the Navajo Reservation to Lake Powell." Animas-La Plata proponents thus
proposed a "Supplemental Agreement" between the Colorado Water
Conservation Board and local water users that, when signed, would commit
local water users to provide necessary replacement water in the event the
Navajo "illegally" diverted water intended for the fish and protect that
water to the legal extent of their ability. The Supplemental Agreement
would terminate if and when the Navajo signed the MOU. "
It is interesting to note here the apparent flexibility in the existing
water regime. If existing water rights holders could commit to replacing
water that could potentially be diverted by the Navajo, why could they not
make that same water available to the Utes, instead of insisting on a
complicated, expensive, and environmentally harmful water project?
Regardless, this "guaranteed replacement" approach eventually
proved satisfactory to all participating parties, and on October 24, 1991, a
Supplemental Agreement was signed. The lengthy Agreement outlined all
the ways in which the federal and nonfederal entities in the Basin would be
liable to provide replacement water should any Navajo decide to divert
water designated for habitat enhancement. 7
With assurances that the RPA would be implemented properly
obtained through the signed MOU and Supplemental Agreement, the FWS
was finally able to issue the Final Biological Opinion for A-LP. The Opinion
came out on October 25,1991, one day after the agreements were signed t7 6
On October 26,1991, Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Sayre officially
broke ground for the Animas-La Plata Project."'
IV. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A REASONABLE AND PRUDENT
ALTERNATIVE
In October of 1991 it seemed that all of the participants' hard work
in constructing an RPA acceptable to the FWS had finally paid off. Based on
new information including "new hydrological information," "updated
hydrology modeling," and renewed consideration of the role other factors

173. Letter from Leonard C. Burch, Chairman, SouthemUte Tribe, et al. to Robert Jacobson,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (May 29,1991) (on file with the author).
174. Memorandum from David Walker, et al. to CWCB Members (Aug. 27,1991) (on file
with author).
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Winter 1991, at Al.
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(e.g., non-native fish, water quality) were playing in the fishes' plight,'7' the
FWS settled on an RPA that would allow the original A-LP to go forward
in modified form while theoretically mitigating jeopardy to the fish.
Project proponents were now free to begin construction on the
long-awaited A-LP, although conditions concerning the project and San
Juan River operations had certainly changed over the course of the yearand-a-half since the Draft Biological Opinion had been issued. The project
had been constrained to a fraction of its original size, at least temporarily,
and the San Juan Recovery Implementation Program would affect water
users throughout the Basin. The required reoperation of Navajo Dam and
the return to a more natural hydrograph would impact irrigators, anglers,
tribes, recreationists, and many others. The following is a review of the five
components of the RPA, all of which would have to be implemented to
avoid jeopardy to the fish, followed by a consideration of the pros and cons
of this approach.
A. Components of the RPA
(1) Reduction in Initial A-LP Depletions'
After reviewing current hydrological conditions and how the BOR
could operate Navajo Dam to mimic the natural hydrograph, the FWS
determined that an initial depletion of 57,100 acre-feet of water for the
project-instead of full A-LP depletions of 154,800 acre-feet-would not be
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Colorado pikeminnow,
assuming the implementation of all elements of the RPA. The allowed
depletion represents that portion of the project available from the construction of Ridges Basin Dam and Reservoir, Durango Pumping Plant, and the
inlet pipeline. This restricted depletion was based in part on the fact that in
1991, average annual flows on the San Juan at the gage in Bluff, Utah, had
already been depleted by 27 percent." "Further depletions associated with
the project would raise that figure to 34 percent. By comparison, the Green
and Colorado Rivers have been depleted approximately 20 percent (at
Green River) and 32 percent (at Cisco), respectively." 8 1 The Opinion stated
that no construction beyond the agreed upon primary elements could be
initiated until the completion of the seven-year fish study and a determination that full A-LP development would not jeopardize the fish. 2

178. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 176, at 28.
179. Id. at 32
180. Id. at 2.

181.

Id.

182.

Id. at 34.
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(2) Seven Years of Research to Determine EndangeredFish HabitatNeeds'83
The Bureau of Reclamation agreed to fund approximately seven
years of research effort on the San Juan River and its tributaries with
emphasis on observing a biological response in the endangered fish
population and habitat conditions. This research would be conducted by
knowledgeable endangered species and habitat experts and would allow for
testing of hypotheses. The ultimate goal of this research would be to
characterize those factors that limit native fish populations in the San Juan
River and to provide management options to conserve and restore the
endangered fish community. Approval for study design would jointly rest
with the FWS and the BOR. During this time, total annual depletions would
not be allowed to exceed 3000 acre-feet. Existing projects, e.g., NIP, San
Juan-Chama, etc., could be subjected to additional conservation measures.
(3) Reoperationof Navajo Dam to Mimic a More Natural Hydrograph'"
The Bureau of Reclamation would be obligated to operate Navajo
Dam under study guidelines developed under element two for the research
period so that releases mimic a natural hydrograph. Test flows would be
provided to re-create a wide range of flow conditions including high flows
similar to 1987, which are hypothesized to benefit reproduction and
recruitment in the endangered fish community.
"Since 1963, Navajo Dam has significantly altered the flow of the
San Juan River by storing peak flows and releasing water in summer, fall,
and winter months. The result is a 45 percent decrease in spring peak flows
and doubled winter base flows at the Bluff gage in Utah."*8 Similar
comparisons can be made at the upstream gages at Shiprock and
Farmington (see Table 4).'" Additional depletions associated with the full
project would further reduce monthly average flows at Bluff from five
percent in a wet year to as much as 70 percent in a dry year.8 7 The Opinion
states that reoperating Navajo Dam to mimic a more natural hydrograph is
"the most important feature" of the RPA, both for the research period and
for the long term.' "

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

Table 4: Change in Mean Monthly Flow After Navajo Dam (CFS)
Percent Change
Post-Navajo
Pre-Navajo
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Farmington,
NM

170

13,471

418

9,803

+145%

-27%

Shiprock, NM

44

19,790

213

9,045

+384%

-54%

Bluff, UT

65

15,380

250

10,334

+284%

- 48%

(4) GuaranteesRegardingNavajo Reservoir Reoperation'8s
At the end of the approximately seven year research period, Navajo
Dam would have to be operated to mimic a natural hydrograph for the life
of the A-LP Project based on the findings of the research. Hydrologists had
estimated that approximately 300,000 acre-feet of unallocated water per
year would be needed to replicate a natural hydrograph with attention to
shape, timing, volume, and frequency." Under conditions in 1991,
mimicking the natural hydrograph would not be difficult, since each state
was nowhere near depleting its full compact allotment and there was plenty
of "unallocated" water. Computer simulations predicted that 300,000 acrefeet would be available 96 percent of the time in 1991. 9
"However," the Opinion warns, "under full depletions (adding in
all future proposed projects up to each State's full compact allotment), the
300,000 acre feet of water from Navajo Reservoir would be available only
33 percent of the time, which indicates that the ability to provide all four
elements of a natural hydrograph (shape, timing, volume, and frequency)
would be severely restricted."" Anticipating having to share shortages, the
Navajo Nation strongly objected to this aspect of the RPA. The language
was eventually changed to require reoperation only for the life of the
recovery program, rather than for the life of the project. 193

189. Id.at 33.
190. Id.at 35,
191. Id.

192. Id.
193. Interview with Stanley Pollack, Special Counsel for Water Rights for the Navajo
Nation, in Window Rock, Ariz. (Oct. 12,1999).
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(5) Legal Protectionfor Reservoir Releasesfrom Navajo Dam'"
A binding agreement would have to be established within the year
to establish protection of reservoir releases through the endangered fish
habitat to Lake Powell for both the study period and the life of the project.
The Opinion notes that "it is not enough to only release water from Navajo
Dam. There also must be guaranteed delivery of the water so that it
provides the habitat improvement necessary to maintain and increase the
endangered fish population in the San Juan River."" 5 The Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) would also have to include a commitment from the
appropriate parties to develop and implement a Recovery Implementation
Program for the San Juan River."'
The San Juan River Recovery Implementation Program (SJRIP),
initiated in 1992, was slated to run for 15 years, with the first seven years
being a research period. '" Similar to the Upper Basin Recovery Program, it
seeks to allow water development to continue while restoring the two
endangered fish species. The goals of the SJRIP are as follows:
(1) To conserve populations of Colorado [pikeminnow] and
razorback sucker in the Basin consistent with the recovery
goals established under the [ESA]...
(2) To proceed with water development in the Basin in
compliance with federal and state laws, interstate compacts,
Supreme Court decrees, and federal trust responsibilities to
the Southern Utes, Ute Mountain Utes, Jicarillas, and the
Navajos. 19
The SJRIP was originally designed for the Colorado pikeminnow; but when
the razorback sucker was listed in 1991, it was included in the Final
Biological Opinion for A-LP and is now the beneficiary of the same RPA as
the pikeminnow.'"

194. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 176, at 33.
195. Id. at 35.

196. Id.
197. The Navajo Nation agreed to participate in discussions, but did not become a voting
member of the SJRIP Coordination Committee until 1996. See Working Group, supranote 97,
at 18.
198. U.S. FISH & WILDUIFE SERV., supranote 54, at 1.
199. Memorandum from Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to
Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Dec. 16,1991) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to
Upper Colorado Regional Office Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Apr. 24,1992) (on file with
author).
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B. How Reasonable and Prudent?
The RPA contained in the 1991 Final Biological Opinion for the
Animas-La Plata Project was considered by many a "successful" solution to
the conflict between endangered species and water development. Its main
achievement was that it allowed water development to proceed while
technically complying with statutory and regulatory requirements in the
Endangered Species Act. Perhaps most importantly, the SJRIP it required
would potentially enable the Department of the Interior to satisfy its trust
responsibility to both the Ute Tribes and the Navajo Nation.'
Looked at from a different perspective, however, one could
question the wisdom, sincerity, fairness, and practicality of this "win-win"
approah, and wonder if it was indeed "reasonable" and "prudent." One
could argue that, in spite of its well-meaning compromise approach, the
RPA actually ran contrary to the interests of not only the Navajo Nation
(discussed briefly already), but also the Ute Tribes, the endangered fish, and
the federal taxpayers. The final part of this section reviews some of the
more troubling aspects of the RPA, with the aim of piquing the reader's
curiosity about how and why the FWS agreed to implement Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act in this fashion. The following sections then
consider whether this approach was within the bounds of agency discretion
and what constraints may have been unduly influencing agency discretion.
The most troubling aspects of this approach to ESA implementation
have to do with the RPA's impact on the Navajo Nation. The Navajo were
displeased with the FWS Final Biological Opinion for A-LP because, in their
eyes, the RPA posed a direct threat to the realization of their federally
reserved water rights. Leonard Haskie, interim president of the Navajo
Nation, expressed some of these concerns in a letter to the Secretary of the
Interior when he saw in what direction the RPA was heading:
While the Navajo Nation appreciates the importance of the
[A-LP] Project to the recent Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
settlement, we cannot allow the [NIIP], nor any other Navajo
water, to be sacrificed for the [A-LP] project. We understand
that you have trust responsibilities to the other Indian tribes
involved. All we ask is that you strenuously represent the
interests of all the Indian tribes, including the Navajo
Nation.2 '

200. The RPA alone would not satisfy the trust obligation since it only allowed part of ALP.The irrigation component of A-LIP, critical to both Ute Tribes, would have to undergo
another Section 7 consultation in the future. Witte, supra note 101, at 16-17.
201. Letter from Leonard Haskie, Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan (Aug. 8,1990) (on
file with author).
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Arguably, relying on water from Navajo Dam to offset A-LP's depletions
and recover the fish threatened the completion of the Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project (NIIP) and the Navajo's right to use Navajo Reservoir
water.' It also threatened their claims to San Juan water above and beyond
a completed NIIP.Y Some facts about NIIP will help illuminate the
situation.
NIIP was authorized in 1962 along with the San Juan-Chama
Project, 2 which diverts water from the San Juan River into the Rio Grande
Basin and on to New Mexico. The project was meant to satisfy at least part
of the Navajo's reserved water rights claims on the San Juan River.' NIIP
is managed by the Navajo Agricultural Products Industry (NAPI) to
provide irrigation on Navajo land in northwest New Mexico, south of
Farmington. The water for NIIP is stored in Navajo Reservoir behind
Navajo Dam, which was completed in 1963.'
NIIP's authorization includes an annual water supply of 508,000
acre-feet to irrigate 110,630 acres of land on the Navajo Reservation. °7 The
project was broken into 11 blocks, each with about 10,000 acres of irrigable
land.' The BOR initially planned to complete the entire NIIP by 1976, but
did not start construction until 1973. Limited operation began in
1976-1977.' For a number of reasons, NIIP construction has been
continually delayed, while the San Juan-Chama Project was constructed
immediately after authorization.21
In 1991, NIIP was only depleting 132,980 acre-feet of its allowed
" ' Blocks I through 6 were complete,
508,000 acre-feet of water each year.21
but less than 65,000 acres of the project's 110,630 acres were being
irrigated.212 For these reasons, the authorization of another project in the
Basin that would deplete San Juan River water before NIIP was complete

202. Interview with Stanley Pollack, supra note 193.
203. See generally Working Group, supranote 97.
204. Act of June 13,1962, Public Law 87-483,76 Stat. 96.
205. Whether the Navajo have rights to water above and beyond water for NIP is a point
of legal contention. For an exploration of the issue, see Judith E. Jacobsen, The Navajo Indian
IrrigationProject and Quantificationof Navajo Winters Rights, 32 NAT. RMsoURCs J.825 (1992).
Jacobsen concludes that NIIP does not satisfy the Navajo's entire claim, and they could be
legally eligible for more water rights in the San Juan.
206. Id. at 831; Judith E. Jacobsen, A Promise Made: The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project
and Water Politics in the American West, (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of
Colo.) (on file with Univ. of N.M. library) [hereinafter Jacobsen, Promise].
207. Working Group, supra note 97, at 4.
208. Id.
209. See Jacobsen, Promise, supra note 206, at 13.
210. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for this apparent inequity, see id.
211. Working Group, supra note 97, at 15.
212. Id. at 4.
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was seen as a threat, especially given the constraints created by the
endangered fish.3'
A second, related reason the Navajo were upset by A-LP's Final
Biological Opinion and the RPA contained therein was because it preempted Section 7 consultation on NIIP.Even though NIIP was authorized
six years before A-LP, it did not undergo Section 7 consultation regarding
the pikeminnow until after the A-LP consultation in 1991.14 A-LP's Final
Biological Opinion was issued on October 25, 1991, followed three days
later by NIIP's Final Biological Opinion on October 28,1991.215 NIIP's Final
Opinion stated that existing NIIP depletions would be allowed, but
additional depletions to complete the project would not. The FWS wrote
that additional depletions for NIIP were "beyond the point of jeopardy
delineated in the.. .Animas-La Plata Biological Opinion" and that "any
further depletions considered necessary for the operation of NIIP will be
evaluated based on the results of the 7-year research program as stipulated
in the Animas-La Plata Biological Opinion."216
As the Working Group on the Endangered Species Act and Indian
Water Rights observed in 1999, "it is a severe point of contention for the
Navajo Nation that 37 years after NIIP authorization and 23 years after the
Secretary of the Interior signed a contract for the use of water through NIIP
facilities in 1976, construction of NIIP is still not complete."" 7 Adding insult
to injury was A-LP's "jumping ahead" of NIIP.
The FWS ultimately prioritized depletions for A-LP over depletions
for the completion of NIIP in 1991 because BOR's consultation on A-LP was
begun and completed earlier than the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA)
consultation on NUP. Therefore, because A-LP underwent ESA consultation
before NIIP, A-LP was considered part of the environmental baseline when
looking at how the completion of NIIP would affect the hydrology of the
river and the fish. If the NIIP consultation had been completed before A-

213.

Stanley Pollack, IntegratedWater ResourceManagement in the San Juan Basin. The Navajo

Perspective, NEwSL N.M. WATER RESOURCES RES.INST., Sept. 1996, at 34.

214. NIIP underwent Section 7 consultation in 1979 regarding its impact on terrestrial
species like the black-footed ferret, the bald eagle, and the peregrine falcon and received a No
Jeopardy opinion. No mention was made at that time of the project's potential impacts on
aquatic species in the San Juan River. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Final Biological Opinion on
the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (Apr. 26,1979) (on file with author).
215. The Biological Opinion on NIlP was for Blocks 1 through 8 only, because the Navajo
believed that consultation on the full project would yield a Jeopardy Opinion, like the Draft
Biological Opinion for A-LP. Blocks 1 through 8 could probably be mitigated with an RPA.
Consultation on Blocks 9 through 11 was postponed since construction of those Blocks was still
several years away. Working Group, supra note 97, at 18.
216. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Final Biological Opinion for the Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project, New Mexico (Oct. 28,1991).
217. Working Group, supranote 97, at 5.
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LP's consultation, then the full NIIP would have been in the environmental
baseline when looking at A-LP's effect on the river, and A-LP may not have
been allowable.
Instead, the environmental baseline in A-LP's Final Biological
Opinion included only those portions of NIIP that had already been
constructed and put into operation in 1991.218 A-LP's Final Biological
Opinion states,
Pursuant to Section 7 regulations, the baseline for the project
included: (1) the past and present impacts of Federal, State,
and private actions in the basin; (2) the anticipated impacts of
all Federal projects having previously undergone formal
Section 7 consultation in the area; and (3) the impact of State
or private actions contemporaneous with this consultation.
There are no Federal projects in the area that have undergone
formal Section 7 consultations nor any contemporaneous
State or private projects that would affect the
Included in the baseline, along with a number of
baseline ....
other smaller water projects, are existing operational portions
of the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project.... 19
Blocks 7 through 11 of NIP were thus excluded from the environmental
baseline for A-LP, as were Southern Ute Indian water rights on other
tributaries to the San Juan River that had been quantified but had not yet
been put to use. Jicarilla Apache water rights, then in the final stages of a
negotiated settlement, were also excluded. Existing depletions for the San
Juan-Chama Project, as well as the paper rights of several non-Indian water
users (which had not yet been put to use), were included in the baseline, as
were evaporation losses from Navajo Reservoir. Referring to these apparent
inconsistencies, Navajo water attorney Stanley Pollack asks, "Why were the
paper rights of non-Indian water rights holders included in the baseline, but
the paper rights of the tribes were not?"'
Thus, one could argue that the authorization of A-LP in the Final
Biological Opinion was ultimately dependent on shifting the burden of
providing water for the fish from existing water rights holders on the San
Juan River to the Ute, Navajo, and Jicarilla Apache tribes." This has created

218. Interestingly, the Draft Biological Opinion for A-LP included the entire NiP in the
environmental baseline. Id. at 14-15.
219. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 176, at 20-21.
220. Interview with Stanley Pollack, supra note 193. The term "paper" water rights, as
opposed to "wet" water rights, refers to water rights that have been granted and recognized
but have not yet been put to use.
221. While this may seem like a radical argument, it should be recognized that the part of
A-LP authorized in the RPA would benefit only the non-Indian community, which might have
been bumped to junior status on the river had the tribes asserted their federally reserved water
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tremendous conflict between the tribes. A-LP proponents often claimed that
their goal was to satisfy the federal trust responsibility to the tribes, but in
the process, the Navajo's rights may have been compromised. A-LP
proponents have seemingly relied on the assumption or hope that the
300,000 acre-feet per year required from Navajo Reservoir for the seven
years of research will become permanently available, in spite of the
Navajo's concerns about their own reserved rights in the San Juan River,
which have yet to be quantified.'m Guaranteed flows from Navajo Reservoir
(potentially at the Navajo's expense) would be the only realistic way to
offset the eventual completion of A-LP.m
Additionally, one could question how "reasonable" or logical the
RPA is, given its authorization of only the beginning phases of the original
A-LP. The elements authorized would not be functional in a stand-alone
fashion, and construction of the remaining elements would be contingent
on a later assessment of the endangered species' status. Should the FWS
find that the species had not made sufficient progress after the seven years
of research and dam reoperation, it could theoretically deny authorization
of the rest of A-LP. This would not only be an affront to the Ute tribes,
whose water was scheduled to be developed and delivered in a later phase
of the project; but also to all federal taxpayers, who may well wonder why
the federal government allowed one half of an expensive project to be built
when it could not commit to authorizing the second half.
Furthermore, the FWS may have been backing itself into a comer
with this approach. If it felt pressure to allow A-LP to begin construction in
spite of the fish, one can only imagine the kinds of pressure the agency
would be subjected to if it contemplated not allowing an already halfcompleted project to continue! In a way, by taking the approach outlined in
the RPA, the FWS was setting itself up for another Tellico Dam situation,
where it would potentially be forced to choose between protecting an
endangered species and allowing a half-completed federal project to
continue. The conflict would be even more heated in the San Juan River
Basin because of the Indian water rights component of the project.
If the fish did not show sufficient progress after seven years of
research and reoperation of Navajo Dam and the FWS had the political

rights more forcefully and preempted the non-Indian water rights. Meanwhile, in 1991, the
reserved rights of the tribes were all being put on hold in one way, shape or form so that the
first part of A-LP could go forward. A similar but less radical argument would say that the
burden for recovering the fish shifted from the Ute Tribes to the Navajo Nation, since a
Jeopardy Opinion for A-LP would mean the Ute Tribes would lose out, but an RPA for A-LP
would put the Ute Tribes effectively ahead of the Navajo Nation in line.
222. Pollack, supranote 213, at 33.
223. Steve Hinchman, Animas-La Plata:The last Big Dam in the West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 1.
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courage to prohibit the remainder of A-LP from being constructed with a
Jeopardy Opinion, one likely outcome would be the Ute Tribes resorting
back to litigation to realize their claims, since they would not be likely to get
the water they had been promised in the CUIWRSA via A-LP.2' 4 Reopening
litigation regarding the tribes' reserved water rights would arguably be a
nightmare for existing water users in the basin and time-consuming and
expensive for the tribes. In many ways, it seems that the FWS was setting
itself up for potential failure later on down the road. It would potentially
have to choose between protecting the fish as required under the ESA and
meeting the expectations of the tribes, the non-Indian water users in the
basin, and the federal taxpayers who might not appreciate seeing a partially
completed federal project scrapped.
What is interesting is that there seemed to be a sort of unspoken
assumption surrounding negotiations in 1991 that the FWS would
ultimately allow the entire project to be built. The MOU attached to the
Final Biological Opinion describes the RPA as providing for construction of
"an initial portion of the project."' Similarly, one BOR employee characterized the RPA as "a means of starting construction on the full Animas-La
Plata project-in other words, it is an incremental step toward completing
the full project." 6
It is not clear whether these attitudes were indicative of simple
arrogance or naive optimism about the recovery program's ability to
improve the status of the fish sufficiently to allow the rest of the A-LP
Project to go ahead in just seven short years. The leaders of the two tribes,
Leonard Burch (Southern Utes) and Judy Knight-Frank (Ute Mountain
Utes), seemed to characterize the latter outlook in this 1991 statement: "We
view [the RPA] as a painful yet practical solution which will allow the
needs of Indian[s] and non-Indians in both states to be met and permit the
inevitable effort to recover the squawfish to get underway. It is certainly
preferable to long and expensive litigation with an unknown end result."'
In a December 1990 briefing paper, the Solicitor for the Department
of the Interior's Southwest Region wrote, "construction of a portion of [the

224. Another result may have been congressional reconsideration and weakening of the
Endangered Species Act, as occurred after Tennessee Vall eAuthorityv. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
It is reasonable to hypothesize that the potential for this outcome may have influenced the FWS
decision-making process.
225. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, The Navajo Nation, The Southern Ute Indian Tribe, The Ute Mountain Ute
Indian Tribe, and The Jicarilla Apache Tribe 1 (1991), in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Final
Biological Opinion for the Animas-La Plata Project, Colorado and New Mexico, at app. A (Oct.
25,1991) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
226. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 105, at 21.
227. Letter from Leonard C. Burch & Judy Knight-Frank, supra note 172.
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Animas-La Plata Project] represents a gamble that more may be built later.
This is important because that is the only way the Ute Tribes will benefit
and their water rights claims will finally be settled under the 1988 water
rights legislation."' This comment raises some interesting questions. Was
this "gamble" really "the only way" the Ute Tribes could benefit and settle
their claims? The CUIWRSA was created without the knowledge that A-LP
would be competing with endangered fish. A reasonable individual might
wonder why the idea of revisiting the assumptions and goals in the
CUIWRSA, and rethinking the approach to the government's trust
responsibility to the tribes, was such anathema to those seeking an RPA for
A-LP.
Even the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) admitted
some reservations with the RPA approach to satisfying the CUIWRSA. In
a 1991 letter to Colorado Governor Roy Romer discussing the pros and cons
of signing the MOU for the A-LP RPA, CWCB Director David Walker writes
the following:
The cost of constructing the second phase is entirely the
responsibility of the nonfederal participants. The cost of the
Colorado facilities is about $124 million in 1987 dollars. The
Board does not foresee that funds of that magnitude will be
available to support that irrigation development and thereAll of the Indian
fore concludes that Phase II is unlikely ....
water would be available in Ridges Basin Reservoir with no
delivery systems until phase 2. As noted before, the funding
for phase 2 is not likely. The result is that the Indian water
will be for uncertain future uses unless the Tribes seek to
lease or sell water out of state... .The concern for Colorado is
that while the settlement agreement may be satisfied, Colorado will be unlikely to benefit from the anticipated beneficial
consumptive use in Colorado. 9
Interestingly, in the last sentence, Walker expresses concerns about
Colorado not being able to use its water without Phase II conveyance
facilities. He does not express concern about the tribes not being able to use
their water.
Walker points out elsewhere in the letter, however, that one
advantage to signing the MOU would be that "the commitment to fulfilling
Ute Indian reserved rights claims" would be advanced.'m Thus he seems to
be saying that by going along with the RPA, Colorado would be moving

228.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 105, at 21.

229. Letter from David W. Walker, Director, Colorado Water Conservation Board, to
Colorado Governor Roy Romer 2,4 (Sept. 3,1991) (on file with author).

230. Id. at 3.
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towards fulfillment of its legal obligations, but would be doing so knowing
that the Ute Tribes would likely have no real way to actually use their
water.
The letter goes on to point out advantages of going along with the
RPA besides making a "good faith effort" towards the tribes: "the state will
gain a storage facility capable of yielding for Colorado about 122,000 acre
feet of water toward utilizing Colorado's compact entitlements, with
construction costs largely borne by the federal government."23' Even if
Coloradans could not use the water, developing it and storing it was
viewed as a good thing (especially with the federal government picking up
the bill), in that it would keep the Lower Basin states from using Colorado's
water.
C. Summary of Findings
This review and analysis of the Animas-La Plata Project's ESA
consultation history reveals at least two key points worth considering. First,
I argue that another "naked" Jeopardy Opinion for A-LP-that is, a
Jeopardy Opinion with no RPAs, like the 1990 Draft Biological Opinion-was simply not part of the practical range of choice open to the FWS
as it prepared the 1991 Final Biological Opinion. Second, it seems that
decision makers involved in the formulation of an RPA for A-LP may have
been working with an unnecessarily constrained range of choice. Alternatives to the original Animas-La Plata project were never really considered
by the BOR or the FWS during the consultation process. Participants in the
search for an RPA were continually reminded that a non-A-LP alternative
was not an option.
The ESA requires the FWS to work with the action agency (in this
case the BOR) to develop an RPA to the project under consultation in the
event of a determination that the project is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the listed species. An alternative is deemed
reasonable and prudent only if, 2
* It can be implemented by the lead federal agency in a manner
consistent with the intended purpose of the project.
* The FWS believes it would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing
the continued existence of listed species.
" It can be formulated in such a way that it can be implemented
by the lead federal agency consistent with the scope of its legal
authority and jurisdiction.

231.
232.

Id. at 2.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
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It is economically and technically feasible.

So why was a non-A-LP alternative never considered? Could there not have
been a less environmentally harmful way for the BOR to satisfy "the
intended purpose of the project" that would be "consistent with the scope
of its legal authority and jurisdiction" and "economically and technically
feasible"? Perhaps, but as already mentioned, the FWS has a significant
amount of discretion in its selection of a reasonable and prudent alternative,
and the courts have systematically deferred to the implementing agency's
judgment. The FWS may have been within the bounds of its discretionary
authority in the A-LP case,' but it also may have made choices based on
an unnecessarily constrained range of alternatives.
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, an RPA must be
implementable by the lead federal agency in a manner "consistent with the
intended purpose of the project" and "consistent with the scope of its legal
authority and jurisdiction. " ' The purpose of the Animas-La Plata Project
was "to provide an assured, long-term water supply capable of meeting
identified needs in the Project area," including meeting Ute tribal water
needs as defined in CUIWRSA, and providing "a dependable long-term
water supply for neighboring Indian and non-Indian community water
needs. " ' Given this project purpose, the range of choices open to the FWS
and the BOR in the development of an RPA for A-LP could, in theory, have
been much broader than it was, and could have included a non-A-LP
alternative.
Why did the FWS not consider other ways to meet the purpose and
need of A-LP in its 1990-1991 consideration of RPAs? Given the purpose
and need of A-LP, outside consultants were able to come up with an
innovative approach that combined structural and non-structural aspects,
met the needs of the CUIWRSA, was less environmentally harmful, and cost

233. In a separate unpublished study, I sought to define the boundaries of agency
discretion in the formulation of Biological Opinions by analyzing the outcomes of cases where
the legitimacy of a Biological Opinion had been called into question. The courts have laid out
fairly dearly the bounds of agency discretion in the formulation of these opinions. See generally
Hannah Gosnell, Water, Fish, Tribes, and Choice: A GeographicEvaluation of Endangered Species
Act Implementation in the San Juan River Basin, USA (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Univ. of Colo.) (on file with author).
234. 50 C.P.R. § 402.02 (2000).
235. U.S. BUREAU OF RELAMAION, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANwAs-LA PLATA PRojEcT
COLORADO-NEw MEXICO: FINAL SUFPL MENTTO THE FNALENVIRONMENTALSTATEMENT, at I-I

to -2 (1996).
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a fraction of what A-LP would cost.23 6 What kept the FWS from developing
such a plan for its RPA in the Final Biological Opinion in 1991?
Although it appears that a non-A-LP alternative could have been
legally viable under the statutes and regulations surrounding Section 7, the
fact remains that the consultation process has not traditionally been used
as a means to generate a wide range of alternatives to a project. Rather, it
has typically been used to make slight adjustments to the proposed,
jeopardizing project. When this issue was raised with experts involved in
ESA implementation, a common response was, "well, that's what NEPA
[the National Environmental Policy Act] is for... ."' The reasoning seemed
to be that the consideration of a broad array of alternatives happens at the
NEPA stage, and then the preferred alternative is subjected to Section 7
consultation if necessary.
New Mexico Department of Game and Fish biologist David Propst
has argued that if a project gets to Section 7 consultation under the ESA and
receives a Jeopardy Opinion, then the NEPAI process has not done its job
in screening out environmentally harmful projects.' Propst asserts that
while NEPA is set up to facilitate the consideration of a wide range of
alternatives, the Section 7 consultation process is not. By the time a project
gets to Section 7 consultation, Propst argues, the FWS is somewhat
constrained in terms of its ability to rethink the whole approach to the
project purpose. Thus, decisions made in the formulation of the EIS under
NEPA are critical in that they set a certain path for a given project and
potentially preclude certain options later on.

236. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Inc., Animas-La Plata Alternatives Study 3-5 (Oct
8,1995) (unpublished study, prepared for the Four Comers Action Coalition, Taxpayers for the
Animas River, Sierra Club, and SCLDF, on file with author). This study came up with an
alternative to A-LP based on structural and non-structural elements. In creating an alternative,
the study focused on all types of Indian water uses and on non-Indian municipal and industrial
water uses (no irrigation consideration). The alternative would deliver 103,500 acre-feet per
year, would meet the requirements of the Ute settlement, and would deplete only 62,000 acrefeet from the San Juan River annually. The total ertimated costs for the alternative were $264
million, less than the federal share of Phase I of A-LP. The study concludes that, aside from the
example alternative examined in the study, many other practicable alternatives to A-LP do
exist.
237. For example, Nancy Gloman, Chief of the Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, said this at the American Water Resources Association's 1999 Annual
Water Resources Conference on Watershed Management to Protect Declining Species (Dec. 5-9,
1999, Seattle, WA), in response to a question from the audience regarding the need to consider
a broad range of alternatives when developing a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative. Also,
David L. Propst said this in our interview. See supranote 112.
238. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
239. Interview with David L. Propst, supra note 112.
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The problem with this system, however, is that NEPA "has no
teeth." Thus, "bad" projects can become the "preferred alternative." 2' The
Section 7 consultation process represents an unused opportunity to rethink
and reassess a questionable project. Unlike NEPA, Section 7 of the ESA does
have "teeth." As Chief Justice Burger ruled in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill,
One would be hard-pressed to find a statutory provision
The
whose terms were any plainer than those in Section 7 ....
plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
The legislative history undergirding Section 7 reveals
cost ....
an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford
first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species. The pointed omission of the type of qualifying
language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the "primary missions" of federal
agencies... .The plain language of the Act, buttressed by its
legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the
value of endangered species as "incalculable."241
I assert that this powerful authority has not been used as effectively as it
could be used in the FWS approach to the consultation process. To remedy
this, there should be a broad consideration of alternatives at all significant
junctures, especially ones where the proposed project has been found to be
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a species protected under the
Endangered Species Act.
There are several possible explanations for the reluctance of the
FWS to use its power in the A-LP case. The FWS was confronted with
political constraints (e.g., the mandate to comply with CUIWRSA and to
develop the Upper Basin's apportionment of Colorado River water) that
manifested themselves as pressure from higher up. Secretary of the Interior

240. NEPA was enacted in 1969 to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment" and to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4321, by requiring rigorous analysis of alternatives to any
proposed federal action likely to have a significant impact on the environment. NEPA
regulations regarding alternatives analysis require, among other things, that "all reasonable
alternatives shall be given detailed consideration;" that "reasons for eliminating alternatives
from detailed consideration shall be given;" and that "the 'no action' alternative shall be
included." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1999). However, neither the law nor the regulations command
agencies to act in a way that prevents or eliminates damage to the environment. See GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS ETAL., FEDERAL PuBuc LAND AND RESOURCE LAw 332-62 (3rd ed. 1993) for
thoughtful commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the Act.
241. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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Manuel Lujan had been a longtime supporter of A-LP and was not
interested in looking at alternatives to the full project.
There were also constraints facing the FWS related to scientific
uncertainty. Since the FWS could not say for sure that Navajo Dam releases
would not serve the same purpose as native flows from the Animas River,
the agency probably could not have scientifically justified another naked
Jeopardy Opinion.
These were all significant constraints on the FWS use of its
discretionary authority in the formulation of a final Biological Opinion.
Since these constraints are largely due to ideological factors-the politics of
the Colorado River and the disregard for the worth of native "trash fish,"
which resulted in a paucity of scientific research on and understanding of
them-they are more difficult to address and remove.
There were also significant institutional constraints on the Fish and
Wildlife Service's decision making, however, that could be addressed more
easily and immediately. These have to do with shortcomings in the
mechanics of the consultation process.
V. THE MECHANICS OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS AS A
CONSTRAINT ON THE FWS IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 7
Some of the standard operating procedures in Section 7 implementation exacerbate the low prioritization of the native fish species and
prevent the FWS from implementing the ESA the way it was originally
intended. Many of these constraints on the decision-making process have
to do with the relatively passive role played by the FWS during consultation
and the corresponding lead role taken by the action agency.
First, Section 7 puts the burden on the action agency to determine
if its proposed action will jeopardize the species in the first place. 2 This
requires a certain sensitivity to the plight of endangered species and their
habitat needs for which the BOR has not historically been known.
Second, the action agency must initiate consultation with the
FWS.243 Normally, the FWS does not review actions under Section 7 until
action agencies approach them.' For the same reasons mentioned above,

242. Section 7(a)(2) appears to place the FWS in an advisory role, stating that all federal
agencies "shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of [FWS or NMFS], insure that any
action authorized.. .is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species." The Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
244. Working Group on the Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights,
Implementation of Section 7 of the ESA in Relation to Indian Water Resource Development 19
(Aug. 11, 1999) (unpublished draft, on file with author) [hereinafter Working Group,
Implementation].
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the BOR historically has not demonstrated an inclination towards being
proactive in addressing environmental problems.24 As the Working Group
on the ESA and Indian Water Rights observes, "It has taken years to
develop agency procedures, sensitize agency officials, and promote the
necessary inter-agency communications to persuade and require agencies
to consult with the Services when their actions may affect listed species or
critical habitat." 246
Indeed, in the case of the San Juan River, the FWS had to contact the
BOR to encourage the agency to initiate reconsultation on A-LP.' 7 The BOR
did so, but with reluctance, as evidenced by a 1987 letter from Colorado
Fisheries Team Leader John Hamill to FWS Assistant Regional Director for
Region 6 regarding the possibility of reinitiating consultation on ALP.
Hamill wrote,
I should point out that Reclamation is very concerned about
the political ramifications of consulting on the Animas-La
Plata project. Apparently, the project is in lots of financial and
political trouble and they fear that an endangered species
issue might be the final blow to kill the project. Reclamation
even indicated a willingness to initiate a recovery effort on
the San Juan (including the reoperation of the Navajo Project)
as an alternative to Section 7 consultation on the project.24
In the A-LP case, the project was significant enough that the FWS took the
initiative to prompt the BOR to request reconsultation. But in less prominent cases, because of an increasing workload for the FWS and insufficient
funding, "FWS officials do not often seek to urge consultations on more
agency actions."249 Thus, this aspect of the Section 7 regulations seems to
discourage the initiation of needed consultations.
Third, the responsibility for collecting the best scientific and
commercial data for the consultation rests, again, on the action agency.' In
reinitiating consultation on A-LP, for example, the FWS and BOR established a "consultation team" comprised of biologists and hydrologists from

245.

Id. at 18. The Working Group states, "Twenty years ago compliance with the mandate

of Section 7was often dependent on FWS officials sending the action agency a letter suggesting
that they initiate consultation because an endangered species, perhaps obscure or unknown
to agency engineers and contractors, resided in the area of the new water project."
246. Id.
247. Memorandum from John Hamill, supra note 95. The BOR was also pressured into
requesting reconsultation by a letter from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. Letter from Lori

Potter & Federico Cheever, supra note 115.
248. Memorandum from John Hamill, supra note 95.
249. Working Group, Implementation, supra note 244, at 19.
250. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
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each agency."sl The FWS then told the BOR it would need (1) an updated
project description, (2) a description of the environmental baseline as
defined in the Section 7 regulations (50 CFR 402.02), (3) updated biology
and hydrology information for the main stem San Juan and project-affected
tributaries, (4) quantification of the flexibility to operate Navajo Reservoir
and/or the Animas-La Plata Project to benefit listed species, and (5) water
quality (contaminants, temperatures, etc.) for the main stem San Juan and
project-affected tributaries. 2 As one FWS biologist observed, the amount
of information the BOR hydrologists and biologists decide to submit for the
FWS preparation of the Biological Opinion constitutes a major constraint on
the range of choice.' The "quantification of flexibility" required in (4)
above, is particularly subject to interpretation.
This reliance on the BOR's interpretation of "flexibility" in terms of
project design and operation and in terms of opportunities for mitigation
is probably the most troublesome of the constraints stemming from Section
7 regulations and standard operating procedures, though it is not clear if
the statutes and regulations intended this to be the case. In North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, the court stated that the purpose of the Biological
Opinion is "to attenuate any conflicts between the agency action and the
welfare of the endangered species. Reasonable and prudent alternatives
must be proposed by [FWS or NMFS] so that the action agency can evaluate
options that might reconcile any conflict."' This reading of the law makes
it sound like the FWS should be playing more of a lead role in the identification and consideration of RPAs than it did in the San Juan. The potentially
biased interpretations of flexibility espoused by the action agency can have
a constraining effect on the range of choice open to consideration, and
ultimately have a significant effect on the outcome of the Opinion and the
nature of the RPAs identified to mitigate the jeopardizing effects of the
proposed action or project. It simply does not make sense to put such
responsibility in the hands of the agency that is promoting the project. One
must remember that the action agency is working for its client's interests.
In my case study, for example, the BOR initially told the FWS that
it had no flexibility in A-LP design or operations and very little flexibility
in reoperating Navajo Dam to mimic a natural hydrograph. Normally, the
FWS takes what the action agency says at face value, and as Houck puts it,

251. In this case, the team was Errol Jensen, Reed Harris, and Randy Peterson from BOR;
and LeRoy Carlson, Jerry Burton, Keith Rose, and George Smith from FWS. Memorandum
from Galen L.Buterbaugh to Roland Robison, Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Feb.
15, 1990) (on file with author).
252. id.
253. Interview with James Brooks, Project Leader, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in
Albuquerque, N.M. (Jan. 11, 2000).
254. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332,352 (D.D.C. 1980) (emphasis added).
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bends over backwards "to find an alternative within the economic means,
authority, and ability of the applicant."' In this case, FWS field biologist
Keith Rose decided to take a rare stand against the action agency and, given
the flexibility (or lack thereof) presented by the BOR, determined that no
RPA for A-LP existed. As biologist David Propst put it, "the consultation
process is like a game of poker, and in this case, Keith forced the BOR's
hand. " ' The BOR was forced back to the drawing board and, lo and
behold, found that A-LP could indeed be reconfigured and that Navajo
Dam could be reoperated to replace all A-LP depletions.
Interestingly, the media portrayed the 1990 impasse between the
FWS and the BOR as the fault of the FWS: "No alternatives, including
proposed releases of water from Navajo Dam in New Mexico, would satisfy
the [Slervice, the [Jleopardy [Olpinion says."' "Supporters of the project
contend the Fish and Wildlife Service ignored alternatives that would work,
including adjusting releases from existing reservoirs to compensate for the
water taken by the yet-to-be-built Animas-La Plata."' These sound bites
make it sound like the BOR was willing to do anything, and the FWS would
not budge. In reality, it was the BOR that was unwilling to consider some
of the FWS ideas, like reoperating Navajo Dam to replace all A-LP
depletions.
Given these glimpses into FWS-BOR politics, it seems ludicrous that
the FWS had to depend on the BOR's research (or lack thereof) on the fish,
the BOR's interpretation of its own flexibility regarding A-LP construction
and operations, and the BOR's interpretation of its ability to reoperate
existing river operations or utilize other already existing projects to (a) meet
the purpose and need of the proposed project in an alternative way other
than via A-LP and/or (b) mitigate the effects of A-LP if it went ahead.
The 1979 Biological Opinion for A-LP directed the BOR to (1) thoroughly survey the native fish populations of the San Juan River,
(2) determine the environmental needs of the Colorado pikeminnow, (3)
attempt to meet those needs by adjusting the myriad existing projects on the
San Juan River (NIIP, A-LP, Gallup-Navajo, etc.) to the benefit of the
species, and (4) provide and fund artificial facilities in which to spawn and
rear Colorado pikeminnow.1 Yet the BOR waited until 1987 to begin its
surveys and did nothing in the way of adjusting existing projects in the San
Juan Basin until the 1991 Final Biological Opinion required reoperation of
Navajo Dam. This is hardly surprising. What incentive did the BOR have

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Houck, supra note 7, at 319-20.
Interview with David L. Propst, supra note 112.
Ellen Miller, Broken PromiseAngers Tribe, THE DuRANGO HERALD, May 24,1990, at Al.
Miller, supra note 110.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., supra note 91, at 3.
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to spend money on these tasks when they had a No Jeopardy Opinion on
A-LP?
As early as 1985, the FWS and the Colorado River Fishes Recovery
Team expressed concern about the need to reconsider conclusions in the
1979 Biological Opinion and possibly reconsult with the BOR about A-LP.
But there was very little data to justify reinitiating consultation, since the
BOR had not yet begun the required research. Thus, the FWS decided to
wait until the surveys were completed (which did not happen until 1989).
Meanwhile, A-LP proponents were busy negotiating the CUIWRSA with
the Ute Tribes.'W Why did the FWS delay reconsultation? Because they were
dependent on the BOR to provide survey data for them and to reinitiate
consultation.
It must be remembered that the BOR works very closely with its
clients, in this case, the Southwest Water Conservation District (SWWCD),
the main sponsor of A-LP. The SWWCD played an important role
throughout the entire Section 7 consultation process, via the BOR.26' Since
the SWWCD is an appointed (rather than elected) board, it does not
necessarily represent the interests of the general public. Other interest
groups did not have access to the consultation process, another problem
with the regulations implementing Section 7. What incentive did the
SWWCD or the BOR have to find flexibility in the design or operation of the
project they spent so long refining? What incentive did they have to
develop innovative reasonable and prudent alternatives to the full A-LP
construction? The only incentive came when the FWS issued a naked
Jeopardy Opinion, a rare event indeed.'
Predictably, the BOR's approach to identifying an RPA, even after
gathering some of the best regional expertise in the areas of hydrology,
biology, and tribal and water law, was to purposely constrain the range of

260. Negotiations for the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act were ongoing
between 1984 and 1988. See Section M1I(b), supra. See also Witte, supra note 101.
261. SWWCD's role is evidenced by the ongoing correspondence between SWWCD
attorney Frank "Sam" Maynes and the BOR. See, e.g., Letter from Frank "Sam" Maynes, supra

note 118. See also Letter from Frank "Sam" Maynes to FWS Director John F. Turner (May 23,
1990) (on file with author) (discussing a 1979 Stipulation of Settlement providing that the FWS
enter into "good faith discussion" with the SWWCD in evaluating impacts upon any
endangered species that might result from A-LP). The stipulation discussed in the memo also
provides that the SWWCD be included as a participant in the consultation process and that it
be permitted to assist in the preparation of draft and final biological opinions. Another
indication of the SWWCD's involvement in the consultation process is Maynes' role as
Chairman of the Legal Committee developed by the BOR to identify an RPA for A-LP in 19901991. See Memorandum from Frank "Sam" Maynes to Legal Committee (Oct. 25,1990) (on file
with author)).
262. The Draft Biological Opinion for A-LP in 1990 was the only naked Jeopardy Opinion
ever issued in the entire history of FWS Region 6. Interview with Keith Rose, supranote 9.
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alternatives considered and to direct the teams to find a way to allow A-LP
to go ahead without causing jeopardy to the fish. When participants
expressed interest in exploring non-A-LP RPAs, they were rebuffed and
reminded that they were there to find an alternative to the Jeopardy
Opinion, not to A-LP itself,2 0 an approach at variance with the plain
language of the ESA's implementing regulations. The definition of an RPA
in the ESA regulations specifically includes the possibility of an alternative
to the proposed project, as long as it meets the four prongs of the RPA
definition." Had the FWS or some other independent, objective entity been
in charge of the search for an RPA, the range of choice open to the teams
would more likely have been expanded to include such alternatives.
Interestingly, the BOR's approach to developing an RPAconvening a bevy of experts on various aspects of the problem-represents
a highly effective approach to expanding the range of choice. The BOR was
looking at a naked Jeopardy Opinion with no RPAs and had a lot of
incentive to develop some creative alternatives. The approach was
successful. The BOR expanded the range of choice by being more open
minded and rethinking project flexibility, both in terms of project design
and operation and in terms of the BOR's ability to reoperate Navajo Dam
to mimic a natural hydrograph. But that expansion of the range of choices
was hampered in two crucial ways: a "No Action" alternative (e.g., another
naked Jeopardy Opinion) was not on the table, nor were any alternatives
that did not include A-LP as the central component. In this sense, the BOR's
reaction to the Draft Biological Opinion served to expand the range of
choice open to the FWS in some ways, but narrow it in a few critical ways.
The FWS was heavily dependent on the BOR for the development of an
RPA and essentially adopted the RPA presented to it by BOR in 1991.'
In the recent case Southwest Centerfor Biological Diversity v. United
States Bureau of Reclamation,2 the plaintiff environmental group similarly
complained about the lead role of the action agency (the BOR) during
Section 7 consultation. In that case, the BOR characterized its own
"flexibility" in terms of its ability to reoperate Hoover Dam to control lake

263. Interview with David L. Propst, supra note 112.
264. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
265.. On March 4, 1991, the BOR sent the FWS a letter outlining its proposed RPA.
Memorandum from Roland Robison, supra note 169. The BOR asserted that its alternative
"would mitigate all impacts of the proposed construction of A-LI." After "independent
evaluation" of the BOR's proposal, the FWS issued a Revised Draft Biological Opinion, dated
March 21, 1991, that incorporated the Bureau's alternative with a few modifications.
266. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (1997).
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levels in Lake Mead to benefit the Southwestern willow flycatcher. 6 7 One
of the flycatcher's nesting areas is in the Lake Mead delta, where the second
largest continuous patch of native willow habitat in the Southwest exists.6
After consulting with the BOR, the FWS issued a Biological Opinion with
an RPA that essentially allowed the flycatcher habitat to be inundated.
Plaintiffs contended, among other things, that the FWS based the RPA upon
political considerations, and that the FWS should have taken a more active
role in determining the BOR's flexibility. Evidence for the former revolved
around the dramatic reduction in RPA requirements from the Draft
Biological Opinion to the Final Biological Opinion. Plaintiffs basically
argued that the FWS ultimately decided not to require protection of the
Lake Mead delta habitat because it was unduly influenced by the BOR.
The allegations in the Southwest Center case are of particular
interest, not only because of the claims of politically influenced Biological
Opinions, but also because they deal with the FWS formulation of RPAs and
the question of how much discretion the Bureau of Reclamation has to
reoperate existing federal dams and reservoirs to benefit endangered
species. In its Draft Biological Opinion, the FWS required the BOR to use
"the full scope of its authority and discretions to immediately protect and
maintain the 465 hectares (1148 acres) riparian habitat" of the Lake Mead
delta. Under this provision, the BOR was required to provide the FWS with
a "detailed account of the type and extent of discretion available to it in the
management of Lake Mead." The BOR responded that it had limited
discretion because of the Law of the River,' and could only reduce the

267. Flycatcher habitat has been dramatically reduced by development and water
management projects over the years, and with decreasing numbers, the species was listed as
endangered in 1995. The flycatcher is one of over one hundred species that would supposedly
be protected by the Lower Colorado River Multi Species Conservation Program
268. The delta is at the north end of Lake Mead and was created by unusually low water
levels in the reservoir throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Before that time, this area was
usually inundated by normal operations of the Lower Colorado River in accordance with the
decree issued in Arizona v. California,373 U.S. 546 (1963), and the "Law of the River." In the
mid-1990s, water levels began to rise again, inundating what has become flycatcher habitat.
269. The "Law of the River" generally refers to the suite of compacts, statutes, regulations,
and court decisions developed throughout the twentieth century that together guide allocation
and management of the Colorado River. Two interstate compacts form the foundation of that
law: The Colorado River Compact of 1922 (consented to by Congress in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, ch.42, §13,45 Stat. 1064 (1928), codifiedat 43 U.S.C. § 617(I) (1994)); and the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact (consented to by Congress in the Act of April 6,1949,63 Stat.
31 (uncodified)). Other components of the Law of the River include the 1956 Colorado River
Storage Project Act, the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act, the 1973 Colorado River Salinity
Control Act, and the series of cases that began in the 1930s regarding disputed rights between
Arizona and California. For an overview of the history of the Law of the River, see Norris
Hundley, The West Against Itself. The ColoradoRiver-An InstitutionalHistory, in NEWCoURSEs
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level of Lake Mead for the following specific purposes: (1) river regulation,
improvement of navigation, and flood control; (2) irrigation and domestic
uses, including the satisfaction of present perfected water rights; and (3)
power generation. The FWS accepted these claims of limited discretion and
adjusted the RPA accordingly.
Plaintiffs complained that the FWS should have taken it upon itself
to investigate the nature and extent of BOR's discretion, instead of leaving
the task to the BOR. Given the statutory power of the ESA, and given how
it has "turned the prior appropriation system on its ear" in the Upper
Colorado,' it would seem feasible that compliance with the goals of the
ESA could possibly supersede other aspects of the Law of the River. After
all, it is important to remember that since 1973 the ESA has been a critical
part of the Law of the River capable of affecting other aspects of the law, not
a separate and inferior law subject to the Law of the River. It is possible that
a reconceptualization of BOR agency discretion, the Law of the River, and
the relationship between species welfare and Colorado River operations
could result in an expanded range of choice for FWS decision makers
during the formulation of RPAs.
The main conclusion of the Southwest Center court was that the
Biological Opinion was not arbitrary and capricious, since the ESA does not
require the protection of every known habitat of a listed species. The BOR
could opt not to protect the Lake Mead delta habitat as long as the species
in general avoids jeopardy.
The problem with the action agency (and in this case the BOR)
playing the lead role in Section 7 consultation is that the agency's ideologies
and biases (in this case, against the native fish and against nonstructural
approaches to water supply issues) are reproduced, institutionalized, and
become part of the law. As Houck observes and illustrates with multiple
examples, the Section 7 consultation process has evolved into a "permitting
system" where naked Jeopardy Opinions and even innovative alternative
solutions to difficult resource problems are generally precluded from
1
consideration.
Yet another problem with the regulations guiding the Section 7
consultation process has to do with access to the decision-making process
during the formulation of Biological Opinions. A central precept in range
of choice theory is that inclusion of the public generally serves to expand
the range of alternatives considered. In its 1966 report, the National
Research Council found that improving the decision-making process will

FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR IssuES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 9 (Gary D. Weatherford & F.

Lee Brown eds., 1986), and Reisner, supra note 88.

270. Tenney, supranote 43.
271.

Houck, supranote 7, at 326.
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involve (1) generating and evaluating alternatives for consideration by the
people, (2) reporting and disseminating such alternatives for the broadest
possible discussion in the political arena, and (3) striving to assay the value
all segments of society place on specific uses.m The report asserts that
public discussion helps ameliorate "institutional hardening. "M
In most parts of the ESA, the public is invited to play a role in the
implementation of the Act. There are provisions for public participation in
the listing process, designation of critical habitat, recovery plans, and
habitat conservation planning. But during consultation, for some reason, the
public is excluded. This would not be so bad if the project proponents were
excluded as well, making the process as scientific and objective as possible,
but the regulations allow the FWS to circulate draft opinions to the action
agency and the applicantsY4 In practice, this kind of collaboration between
the FWS and the action agency and its clients occurs all the time.
In the case of the San Juan River, the FWS did its best to keep the
deliberations between the FWS and the BOR. Upon learning that the BOR
would reconsult on A-LP with the FWS, however, the SWWCD "secured
the services of one of the nation's preeminent experts on Colorado
[pikeminnow] in the fall of 1989, and was prepared to consult with the
Service. No 'good faith discussions' with the FWS took place, and no
SWWCD participation was permitted by the FWS."I" This enraged the
project proponents, who felt unfairly excluded from the process.
In a letter to FWS Director John Turner that was also sent to then
President George Bush; the congressional delegations of Colorado, New
Mexico, and Utah; the Secretary of the Interior; and others, SWWCD
attorney Sam Maynes wrote the following:
In excluding the SWWCD from the consultation process, a
USFWS position subsequently confirmed by Regional
Director Galen Buterbaugh, your agency is in breach of the
Stipulation of Settlement of April 14, 1983. ' 6 In order to

272.

NATIONAL RESEARCM COUNCIL, ALTRNATIVES IN WATER MANAGEMENT 15 (1966).

273. Id.
274. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501, 1502.9 (1999).
275. Letter from Frank "Sam" Maynes, SWWCD attorney, to John F. Turner, Director, Fish
and Wildlife Service (May 23,1990) (on file with author).
276. Maynes' interpretation of the Stipulation of Settlementfor Colorado Water Conservation

Districtet a! v. Watt was as follows:
the FWS is required to enter into "good faith discussion" with the SWWCD
in evaluating impacts upon any threatened and endangered species that
might result from the [ALP when consultation under Section 7 of the ESA
is requested by any federal agency. Additionally, the Stipulation provided
that the SWWCD would be included as a participant in the consultation
process and would be permitted to assist the U.S. FWS in its preparation of
draft biological opinions and final biological opinions. More significantly, the
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remedy that breach, we request that you withdraw the Draft
Biological Opinion and recommence the consultation process.
Further, we request that the SWWCD be included as a
participant in that consultation and that the USFWS engage
in 'good faith' efforts to develop reasonable and prudent
alternatives that would permit the construction of the A-LP
in a manner consistent with the Endangered Species Act.
Because the Draft Biological Opinion will become a Final
Biological Opinion in the absence of your intervention, we
request your immediate and prompt attention to this matter.
Otherwise, we will have no choice but to seek relief from the
federal court to remedy the 'bad faith' disregard and breach
of our previous Stipulation of Settlement....Your urgent
attention to this matter is genuinely appreciated.'
Directors of the Southwest Water Conservation District and the
Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy District, Fred Kroeger and John
Murphy, respectively, also expressed their dismay at being excluded from
the negotiations leading to the Draft Biological Opinion:
The Districts believe that the Service shirked its duty in
searching for reasonable and prudent alternatives by refusing
to allow the hydrologist, Ross Bethel, and biologist, Rich
Valdez, hired by the SW District and the Tribes to participate
in the Section 7 consultation process for the project .... The
Code of Federal Regulations regarding the Section 7 consultation process does not preclude the Service from entering into
consultation with interested project proponents on a voluntary basis. The Service's failure to identify any reasonable and
prudent alternatives as a result of this consultation could
have been avoided had the Service been willing to work with
a broader range of scientific opinion.'
Because of the regulations guiding Section 7 implementation, and because
of the standard operating procedure that had been developed in the past,
the project proponents felt entitled to participate in the formulation of the

FWS agreed to work together in good faith with the SWWCD to develop
reasonable and prudent alternatives and plans which would permit
construction and operation of the [A.LP) in a manner consistent with the
ESA.
Maynes, supra note 275. When one actually reads the Stipulation, however, there is no
reference to the FWS specifically. Rather the references are to "Interior," which could just as
easily, and more likely, refer to the BOR.
277. Letter from Frank "Sam" Maynes, supra note 275.
278. Letter from Frank V. Kroeger, Director, Southwest Water Conservation District, &
John E. Murphy, Director, Animas-La Plata Water Conservation District, to Ronald Robinson,
Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation (uly 30,1990) (on file with author).
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Biological Opinion. Had it not been for the unusually firm stance taken by
FWS biologist Keith Rose throughout the consultation process, it is likely
that the A-LP proponents would have been more involved.
As ESA legal scholar Oliver Houck points out, allowing the
proponents to participate without creating a mechanism for more general
public involvement is patently unfair.' The public is completely excluded
from the consultation process until the Final Biological Opinion is complete.
On this issue Houck writes
[t]hat the ESA operates largely through the benefit of the
public's interest in and knowledge of endangered species-from listing petitions through enforcement-is beyond
cavil. That Interior would strain so deliberately to exclude the
public-while including the development agencies and
private applicants-from biological opinions is some measure
of just how important it is that the public be involved.
Without public participation, findings of "no jeopardy" are
far easier to reach.?
Houck's observations suggest that more public involvement might work to
influence the FWS to use its discretionary authority to benefit species more
than it does at present.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The FWS decision ultimately to allow A-LP to go forward in spite
of its predicted impact on the endangered fish is significant because the ESA
is one of the few laws with "teeth" strong enough to stop such a wellsupported project. Arguably, the ESA was one of the most challenging
hurdles for A-LP to negotiate. For many reasons, the FWS forfeited the
opportunity to implement the Act as forcefully as it could have, allowing
the project to lumber on only partially impeded.
More importantly, there may have been a missed opportunity to
develop a more innovative solution to the conflict between endangered
species and water demand in the basin. In the same way that forceful
implementation of the Clean Air Act led to the development of new
technologies for pollution control, strong implementation of the ESA might
have resulted in institutional and legal innovations to meet the water needs
of the tribes and non-Indian water interests without constructing a new
project in the San Juan basin. This missed opportunity may well be
attributable to unnecessary constraints on the Fish and Wildlife Service's
range of choice.
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In 1990 and 1991, the FWS made a big effort to comply with the
language and intent of Section 7. Keith Rose, the biologist in charge of
writing the Biological Opinions for A-LP, and his supervisor, Regional
Director Galen Buterbaugh, made a courageous attempt to stop a bad
project by issuing a naked Jeopardy Opinion in 1990. As a result, they
suffered the wrath of their superiors all the way up to the Secretary of the
Interior, as well as senators, congressmen, and other powerful people
throughout the region. But by taking such a strong stand in this case, the
FWS forced the BOR to rethink its "flexibility" and consider a slightly
scaled-down project. The threat of another naked Jeopardy Opinion got the
water users to agree to pay for a research and recovery program for the fish.
It inspired collaboration and innovation.
The naked Jeopardy Opinion, issued in draft form where appropriate, has been an overlooked tool for eliciting cooperation and creativity
from the action agency during the search for a solution to the conflict
between endangered species and jeopardizing federal actions. As mentioned earlier, as of January 2000, the 1990 Draft Biological Opinion for ALP was the only naked Jeopardy Opinion ever issued in the entire history
of Region 6 of the FWS. This fact raises serious questions about the
applicability of the Section 7 consultation process as conceived by Congress
and the Department of the Interior. Should we just eliminate the naked
Jeopardy Opinion as an option for the FWS in Section 7 implementation? Or
should we seek to make the FWS a stronger entity, able to stand up to
political pressure and implement Section 7 the way it was written?
In the experience of Keith Rose, FWS Biologist, there were just too
many constraints-mostly political, in his eyes-to allow any honest and
thoughtful consideration of alternatives to A-LP, other than the mitigation
plan developed in the Final Opinion. 2 The FWS simply did not (and does
not today) have the institutional strength to stand up to the BOR and the
western water establishment.
By reconfiguring the mechanics of the Section 7 consultation
process and refining the regulations surrounding the identification of RPAs,
the FWS could be given more leverage. If the regulations requireda broader
consideration of alternatives, maybe even using NEPA as a model for
alternatives analysis, the FWS might, ironically, be able to use its discretion
more freely than it can now. Without specific guidelines for the identification and selection of alternatives, the FWS is more susceptible to political
pressure from the action agency and other interested parties.
Another possibility would be to combine the NEPA scoping process
with Section 7 consultation. The action agency could be prohibited from
selecting a "preferred alternative" that did not pass muster with the FWS
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and Section 7. This would give NEPA some of the "teeth" it needs and
would, theoretically, prevent a "bad" project from making it out of the
gates. It might be easier for the FWS to exercise its power under Section 7
on a project at this earlier stage in the process.
Similarly, if the FWS took more of a leadership role in the consultation process, in the research used in the consultation process, and in the
identification of RPAs, it would be in a better position to implement the Act
as directed. This is not to say that the burden for developing an RPA should
be placed exclusively on the FWS, but rather that that agency should be
more involved by making suggestions and by ensuring that viable
alternatives are not discarded for political reasons.
Also, access to the decision-making process during consultation
needs to be rethought. The ESA requires that federal agencies "cooperate
with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert
with conservation of endangered species."' Perhaps this statute needs to
be clarified. Did Congress intend that project proponents get involved in
the formulation of the Biological Opinion? Should the decision-making
process be opened up to all interest groups? Or sealed off from all except
the biologists? It would seem that justice would demand one or the other.
Perhaps the main lesson from this analysis is that in spite of the
language in Section 7 of the ESA, and in spite of Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill, a naked Jeopardy Opinion, where a project is sacrificed for the
welfare of a species, is simply not part of the practical range of choice for
the FWS. There are two ways to read this state of affairs. On the one hand,
it represents an incredible human optimism about our ingenuity, our ability
to think creatively, to think "outside the box." The human imagination
seemingly has no limits when it is asked to find a way to have its cake and
eat it too. As Colorado Senator Tim Wirth said about his conversation with
Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan after the FWS issued its Draft Biological
Opinion in 1990, "Isaid it was imperative for him to send the FWS and the
BOR back to find a mitigation plan. There has to be one...." [they just have
not found it yet! ].m
On the other hand, the practical absence of the ability to draw a line
in the sand, to say "No," is representative of a destructive tendency or habit
on society's part. Developers and agency officials charged with implementing tough laws tend to think that there is always a way to have it all if they
just try hard enough. They cannot take "No" for an answer. But at what
cost? The potential loss of species, critical habitat, functioning ecosystems,
biodiversity? Chief Justice Burger ruled in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
that the ESA was supposed to be enforced as written, and that endangered
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species were to take priority over the primary missions of federal
agencies.'
I assert that to realize this superceding authority, the range of
choice for the FWS has to be expanded to include the ability to say "No."
There may well be many instances where "no action" is the most reasonable
and prudent alternative, not only for the species, but also for third parties
such as local citizens and federal taxpayers. This is not to say that all
development in endangered species habitat must stop. When appropriate,
there is nothing so inspirational as a group of creative and determined
minds coming together and organizing, collaborating, brainstorming, and
developing ways to meet all the needs at hand.
This process is usually at its best and most inspired, however, when
confronted with the reality of a "No," or at least the real prospect of a "No."
When walls are encountered, institutional innovation often finds a way to
flourish. If we are to maintain the integrity of the ESA and achieve its goal
of conserving our biological heritage, we must find a way to strengthen the
FWS as an institution so that it has the freedom and the ability to consider
and choose from all reasonable alternatives in the implementation of the
ESA.
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